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General Trends in Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions
C orporate trends in Canada closely parallel those in the United 
States. The increase in merger activity and the building o f conglo­
merates in both countries has been one o f the most significant 
developments in corporation law and finance in the last decade. 
Neither horizontal nor vertical integration is often cited as the 
reason for the increased activity, but rather a trend towards diversi­
fication has developed.1 As in the United States, the new large firms 
are complex, m ulti-product, and inter-industry. Their structure re­
sembles a closed-end mutual fund with the distinguishing character­
istic o f being actively involved in the management o f their holdings.
Not much is known about mergers in Canada.2 For information, 
heavy reliance appears to be placed on American studies. Even 
statistical inform ation regarding the number o f mergers and acquisi­
tions taking place in Canada is lacking.3 However, some distinct 
characteristics have emerged. For example, the number o f foreign 
owned and controlled corporations responsible for merger activity 
in Canada is disproportionately high.4 It also appears that given 
the size o f the Canadian market and the cost o f technological im­
provements, serious consideration must be given to encouraging 
more merger activity so as to make C anadian industries more 
efficient and therefore more competitive both at home and abroad .5
The industry is small compared to the United States. Only 
48 C anadian-based industrial firms would rank in the United States 
list o f its 500 largest corporations.6 With smaller size, Canadian
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companies generally have fewer shareholders. Some companies do 
not make the list o f C anada’s 100 largest companies because, being 
privately owned, they are not required to publish financial inform a­
tion, and reliable estimates o f their size are therefore unavailable. 
M ost notable are wholly owned subsidiaries o f other foreign cor­
porations, e.g., General M otors o f Canada Ltd., Chrysler Canada 
Ltd., American M otors (Canada) Ltd., C anadian International 
Paper Co., and C anadian Johns-M anville C o.7 If the parties involved 
so desire, a relatively large merger or acquisition may go unnoticed 
in Canada. The disclosure of the Weston empire in 1967 was a 
m ajor revelation to Canadians.8 By sales volume, George Weston 
Ltd. ranks fifth in the list o f C anada's m anufacturing, resource and 
utility companies.9
The trend is exemplified by the acquisition o f John Labatt Ltd., 
a major C anadian brewery, by Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. o f Mil­
waukee, Wisconsin, in 1964.10 In February, 1968, Labatt’s acquired 
Ogilvie Flour Mills Co., a major Canadian milling company, by 
issuing cumulative, redeemable, convertible preferred shares and 
some cash in exchange for Ogilvie common shares. The two formerly 
Canadian-owned companies, Labatt’s and Ogilvie, ranked 63rd and 
48th respectively. Combined sales boost L abatt’s position to 27th 
in C anada’s list. Creeping foreign control and diversification have 
dominated corporation finance in the 1960’s in Canada.
The general trend has raised im portant policy issues that have 
yet to be finally resolved in Canada. Only a token attem pt has been 
made to decrease the extent o f foreign ownership and control, and 
even the wisdom o f this has been seriously questioned. Furtherm ore, 
as corporation laws have become increasingly more flexible, a 
vacuum in legislation necessary for public protection and confidence 
has been created which securities regulation has been slow to fill 
in Canada.
In sum, apart from questions o f foreign ownership and control, 
mergers and acquisitions from a business and economic viewpoint 
follow American patterns. Smaller firms and markets have made 
Canadian industry susceptible to the dom ination o f American re­
search and technology, with which it has not been able to compete.
Types o f Mergers and Acquisitions
Traditionally, analysis o f the legal aspects o f corporate mergers 
and acquisitions in C anada has focused on the several procedures
7 The Financial Post, July 20, 1968, at p. 11, col. I.
8 The Financial Post, Dec. 10, 1966, at p. 1, col. 2.
9 The Financial Post, July 20, 1968, at p. 11, col. 6.
10 W. L. Gordon, A Choice for Canada (1966), at p. 86.
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used to  fuse one company with another. They include: a sale of 
assets, a sale o f shares, and a statutory amalgamation. The latter is 
sometimes referred to as a statutory merger11 and, if the fusion 
results in the form ation o f an entirely new corporation, as a statu­
tory consolidation.
(a) Purchase and Sale of Assets
A sale of assets involves the sale by one corporation o f sub­
stantially all its assets to another in return for cash or securities 
and sometimes a com bination o f both of them. Usually the vendor 
is then liquidated, distributing the cash or securities to its share­
holders. Where securities are given in exchange and the vendor 
company is liquidated, the shareholders o f the vendor become share­
holders in the purchasing company. Legally, the vendor company 
need not be liquidated. The cash could be reinvested in a new 
enterprise or, if securities are involved, remain as a holding com ­
pany, provided its objects o f incorporation so permit.
(b) Purchase and Sale of Shares
For many purposes, legally it makes little difference whether 
a company is buying one share or all the shares o f another company. 
Again the consideration given may be cash o r securities or both of 
them. This time, however, the vendor-shareholders obtain the con­
sideration without the necessity o f liquidation proceedings. The 
acquired company becomes a subsidiary o f the purchaser. By then 
liquidating the subsidiary, results can be achieved which are identical 
to those of a purchase and sale of assets. But again, liquidation is 
not essential. In fact, much may depend on whether the acquiring 
company purchased all o r only a part o f the shares o f the other 
company. It may be that the acquiring company only wants control 
o f the other com pany in which case, purchase of 50 per cent o f 
shares may be all that is desirable. Liquidation may not be feasible.
(c) Statutory Amalgamations
Where it is intended that the shareholders of all12 the companies 
involved in the transaction shall be shareholders in the surviving 
company, an alternative route is to proceed under a statutory enact­
ment which amalgamates all the companies involved. This procedure 
is slightly less complex and often has several other advantages.13
11 See e.g., N .Y. Bus. Corp. Law, s. 901.
12 In all procedures, more than two companies may legally be involved in 
the transaction.
13 Infra, at p. 42.
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(d) Mergers and Consolidations v. Acquisitions
The term “ merger” is popularly used to denote a fusion o f 
companies o f relatively equal size and im portance14 where most, if 
not all, o f the shareholders of the constituent corporations continue 
in the surviving corporation. If instead of a surviving corporation 
there is a new corporation, the fusion is called a “consolidation” . 
“ If, on the other hand, a relatively small firm is being absorbed 
into a larger one, an ‘acquisition’, o r in the terminology o f the 
Accounting Bulletin [No. 48 (1957)] a ‘purchase’, is said to have 
been made.” 15 Procedural analysis ignores this distinction and some­
what surprisingly, in the past matters o f substance have been 
governed by procedure.
In many cases the distinction between mergers and consolida­
tions and acquisitions could and should be made. If, for example, the 
shareholders of one or more o f the companies involved ultimately 
receive cash and no longer have any interest in the business, the 
transaction is properly called an acquisition. But if those share­
holders receive shares and have a substantial interest in the surviving 
or new corporation, the transaction is a merger or consolidation. 
Where the consideration is mixed, e.g., cash and securities, or the 
constituent firms are not of relative equal size, the distinction may 
be difficult to make. Nevertheless, because such a distinction may 
be the only one o f real validity for many purposes, e.g., in deciding 
whether a shareholder should have appraisal rights o r what the tax 
consequences o f the transaction should be, it may be very useful 
to exert some effort to make it.
Consider three examples involving a sale o f assets for shares. 
If the purchaser, when compared to the vendor, is relatively large, 
the issuance of new shares will probably not affect control. The 
nature o f the investment of the purchaser’s shareholders will not 
have changed greatly. This is in contradistinction to the shareholders 
o f the vendor. The transaction may properly be called a purchase 
and sale o f assets.
Suppose the companies are o f relatively equal size. Here the 
nature o f the investments o f the shareholders o f each company may 
change substantially and control will probably be shared. De facto, 
the transaction is a merger.
In the extreme case, if the purchaser, when com pared to the 
vendor, is relatively small, the issuance o f shares for the assets o f 
the vendor could conceivably transfer control to the vendor.16 In
14 Baker & Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations (3rd ed., 1959) at 
p. 1435.
15 Ibid.
16 See Farris v. Glen Alden Corporation (1958), 393 Pa. 440, 143 A. 2d 25.
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effect, the shareholders o f the vendor have “ purchased” the pur­
chaser. However, Canadian corporation law is not this refined.
Choice o f Procedure
Any one o f the procedures outlined above can be used to effect 
a merger or acquisition^ There are, however, im portant peripheral 
differences attached to each procedure. Some, such as taxation, can 
be so im portant as to dictate the procedure finally selected.
The differences are both conceptual and historical. For many 
purposes, a sale of assets is a corporate transaction while a sale o f 
shares is an individual property transaction. Each has its own 
attendant consequences. The difficulty is to determine the extent 
to which mergers and acquisitions are governed by these analogous 
concepts from which the basic procedures were derived. Various 
aspects o f both blend to form the statutory am algam ation thus 
further complicating basic notions.
Numerous requirements and consequences have historical 
origins. Several specifically relate back to the doctrine of ultra vires, 
e.g., authorization of a sale of assets and authorization of the pur­
chase of shares in another company.
Given these differences in procedures and results, how do we 
decide the best procedure in any given situation? Some may be 
eliminated on business grounds, e.g., it may be desirable to obtain 
100 per cent control thus making a purchase of shares less feasible. 
In other cases, authorization may be difficult at the shareholder 
level; with some procedures, it is possible for minority shareholders 
to block the entire transaction. As though these corporate problems 
were not enough, C anada’s constitutional division of corporate 
powers imposes possible limitations on various kinds of mergers, 
and then there are the problems of taxation, accountancy, anti-trust, 
and securities regulation. The selection of a particular procedure can 
only be made after a thorough analysis o f these peripheral conse­
quences.
Mergers and Acquisitions—an Historical Overview
The Doctrine o f  Ultra Vires at Common Law'
In mid-nineteenth century England the corporation was an 
independent legal entity created by the state, with powers limited 
to those necessary to undertake the purpose for which it had been 
incorporated. The purpose, o r corporate objects, o f the undertaking 
was defined in a deed o f settlement. This was a document substituted 
for an act o f Parliament and akin to a partnership agreement. It 
established the basis o f the contractual relations between the corpora­
tion, its shareholders, and the state.
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C orporate power was limited to that necessary to attain cor­
porate objectives for several reasons. Parliament replaced the royal 
charters o f the previous century with special act incorporations to 
prevent a recurrence o f the monopolies o f the South Sea Bubble 
Era.17 By restricting corporate objectives by statute, acts not in 
furtherance o f those objects could be struck down as being ultra 
vires the corporation. And if desired, the corporate franchise could 
be withdrawn. Thus, hopefully, the evils o f corporate monopolies 
would not recur.
The doctrine also was intended to protect shareholders and 
creditors. By restricting corporate powers to those incidental to the 
objects expressed in the deed o f settlement, each shareholder knew 
to what purpose his investment was put. If he intended to invest in 
a railway in Wales, the directors were not to use corporate funds to 
buy coffee beans in Brazil. Creditors were similarly concerned.
At first the doctrine applied only to companies incorporated by 
special Acts of Parliament, but it was soon extended to companies 
incorporated by deeds of settlement. They too derived their ultimate 
authority from Parliament. Incorporations by m emorandum o f 
agreements were under similar restrictions. Here lay the basic 
impediments to corporate mergers and acquisitions.
Mergers and acquisitions tend toward concentration o f wealth 
and economic power and sometimes monopoly. They also change 
the nature of the underlying investments; sometimes radically. In 
sum, mergers and acquisitions parallel the types of activity that the 
doctrine of ultra vires was aimed against. At common law, it was 
clear that under the type of corporate objects clauses envisaged by 
Parliament, mergers and acquisitions were ultra vires the company.
A sale of all the assets o f the company was ultra vires on the 
theory that such a sale would be an abandonm ent o f the under­
taking.18 Put another way, the sale would constitute a termination 
of the very reason why the company was incorporated.
17 “The first and second decades of the eighteenth century were marked by 
an almost frenetic boom in company flotations which led to the famous 
South Sea Bubble. Most company promoters were not particularly fussy 
about whether they obtained charters (an expensive and dilatory process) 
and those who felt it desirable to give their projects this hallmark o f  
respectability found it simpler and cheaper to acquire charters from 
moribund companies which were able to do a brisk trade therein. An 
insurance company acquired the charters o f the Mines Royal and Mineral 
and Battery Works, and a company which proposed to lend money on 
land in Ireland and a banking partnership in turn acquired the charter 
of the Sword Blade Company which had been formed to manufacture 
hollow sword blades” : Gower, Modern Company Law (2nd ed., 1957), 
at p. 27.
18 See Simpson v. Westminster Palace Hotel Co. ( 1860), 8 H.L.C. 712, at p. 717,
II E.R. 608, at p. 610.
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For one com pany to purchase the undertaking o f another was 
also ultra vires. In Re Era Assurance Society, Anchor Case19 one 
insurance company could not purchase another insurance com pany’s 
undertaking “ without some special power in the deed o f settlement 
to authorize such a transaction’’.20 Under the deed the directors 
were only empowered to effect assurances in the ordinary course 
which included obtaining a medical certificate and a careful inquiry 
in each case; and the shareholders trusted to the discretion o f the 
directors to be exercised upon the inform ation so obtained.
The shareholders who elected the directors to exercise a special 
discretion o f this kind on every occasion could not have meant to 
authorize the board to accept a mass o f policies on lives o f which 
they could know nothing beyond the fact that they had been accepted 
by another company. If such a transaction were valid, the share­
holders would be subjected to liabilities which they never contracted 
to undertake. Still less did they authorize the directors to take upon 
themselves all the debts o f another company.*»
Similar restrictions prohibited one com pany from purchasing 
shares o f another company. Limited by the objects o f incorporation, 
a company could only exercise its powers for the purpose o f doing 
something hona fide connected with those objects and in the ordinary 
course o f business adapted to their attainm ent. The purchase of 
shares was considered an em barkm ent in a totally different business.22 
There was also the concern that such a purchase would in effect make 
every shareholder a partner or shareholder in the other partnership 
or body.23
There is, however, authority that a merger or acquisition would 
be valid at common law if ratified by every shareholder.24 If in­
corporation is viewed as a contract, this position has merit. Such 
ratification would, in effect, am ount to a change o f the “contract” of 
incorporation. On the other hand, one must consider the position 
o f the state and third parties. It is clear that where a company was 
incorporated by a special Act o f Parliament, even unanimous 
consent could not validate an otherwise ultra vires act. If Parliament
19 (I860), 2 J. & H. 400, at p. 404, 70 E.R. 1113, at p. 1115 (Ch.).
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Joint Stock Discount Co. v. Brown (1866), L.R. 3 Eq. 139, at p. 151, accord 
In re Barned's Banking Company, (1867) L.R. 3 Ch. App. 105, at p. 112.
23 Ex. p. British Nation Life Assurance Association (1878), 8 Ch.D. 679, at 
p. 704; this problem is more acute in partnership than in corporate law.
24 See Simpson v. Westminister Palace Hotel Co., Supra, footnote 18; 
Peterson and Canwood Cooperative Assn. v. Cook, [1923] 1 W.W.R. 1212, 
at p. 1215 (Sask., K.B.).
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thought it wise to limit corporate powers, no majority, however 
large, could sanction the mis-application o f funds.25 It appears this 
latter view prevails in Canada.26
In sum, mergers and acquisitions were ultra vires at early com ­
mon law. The purchase and sale o f assets and the purchase o f shares 
violated the ordinary course o f  business rules relating to directors. 
In mid-nineteenth century, there were no general statutory am alga­
mation provisions.
Mergers and Acquisitions in the Post-Industrial Revolution
“ U ltra vires was the expression of a social policy which failed.”27 
Technological development and business expansion necessitated 
greater corporate freedom than that allowed by the doctrine of 
ultra vires. “ Courts, from having been astute to assure lim itation of 
corporations in the early part o f the 19th century, became almost 
equally astute to find ways o f eluding galling and frequently obsolete 
restrictions. Either the right o f any person to assert that a corpora­
tion had acted beyond its power was cut off in some fashion (usually 
by erection of a judicial theory that he ‘was estopped’ from raising 
the point), or the corporate powers were construed as including 
power to do all acts ‘incidental’ to the main purpose. O f the incidents 
o f an enterprise there is no end.” 28
A sale o f assets was upheld as an incident to the corporate 
power to buy and sell property. In Wilson v. Miers29 the directors 
were authorized to buy, sell, and charter ships. Pursuant to this 
power, they purported to sell the com pany’s entire fleet. The contract 
was upheld under the general authority given to the directors to sell 
their ships. “ The authority  extended to sell some ships, and, if some, 
there is no rule o f law limiting it to less than [the entire fleet], o r to 
a part only.” 30 Earlier cases involving a sale o f the undertaking were 
distinguished on the ground that the sums received could be re-
25 Bagshaw v. The Eastern Union Railway Company (1849), 7 Hare 114, at 
p. 129, 68 E.R. 46, at p. 52 (Ch.).
26 Beck, An Analysis o f  Foss v. Harbottle, in Zeigel, Studies in Canadian 
Company Law (1967), at p. 563. See also Gower, Modern Company Law  
(2nd ed., 1957), at pp. 78-95.
27 Baker and Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations (3rd ed., 1959), at 
p. 358.
28 A. A. Berle, Jr., Historical Inheritance o f  American Corporations in Cases 
and Materials on Corporations (3rd ed., Baker and Cary, 1959), at pp. 1 
and 5.
29 (1861), 10 C.B. (N .S.) 348, 142 E.R. 486 (C.P.).
30 (1861), 10 C.B. (N .S.) 348, at p. 364, 142 E.R. 486, at p. 493 (C.P.)
24 U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL
invested and the business continued. This position has been followed 
in C anada.31
The distinction between a sale o f assets pursuant to a general 
power to buy and sell property and a sale o f the undertaking is 
uncertain. W hile the tendency has been to restrict the latter and up­
hold contracts under the former, the concept o f a sale o f the under­
taking has never been completely abandoned. Several companies 
acts in Canada confer incidental and ancillary powers similar to the 
following:
A company shall possess as incidental and ancillary to the powers 
set out in the letters patent or supplementary letters patent power
to . . .
(m) sell or dispose of the undertaking of the company or any 
part thereof for such consideration as the company may think f i t . . .  
if authorized so to do by the vote of a majority in number of share­
holders present or represented by proxy, at a general meeting duly 
called for considering the matter, and holding not less than two- 
thirds of the issued capital stock of the company;
(o) sell, improve, manage, develop, exchange, lease, dispose 
of, turn to account or otherwise deal with all or any part of the 
property and rights of the c o m p a n y .3*
M asten, J. A., expressed the following opinion of the distinction:
I would suggest that unless the party attacking the transaction 
satisfies the Court that the proposal sale is for a purpose which is 
not within the scope of promoting or carrying on the objects of the 
company as defined in their constating instruments (but is, for example, 
directed towards the winding-up of the company) then clause (o) 
applies; while (m) comes into play only when some branch of the 
company’s charter activities is to be abandoned.3*
While in most jurisdictions34 the m atter is now mainly of 
historical interest because of changes in wording o f the various 
provisions, in some the problem still remains.35
31 Hovey v. Whiting (1886), 14 S.C.R. 515 (Board of directors have the 
power to make an assignment of all the assets of a company); Brown v. 
Moore (1921), 62 S.C.R. 487 (Power to sell the lands and property implied 
in the nature of the business, it not being established the company was 
disposing of its whole undertaking); Ritchie v. Vermillion Mining Co., 
(1902), 4 O.L.R. 588 (Sale by company of all its mines not ultra vires 
because there was nothing to prevent the business being continued by 
purchasing other mines); and see also, Ellis v. Norwich Broom and Brush 
Co. (1906), 8 O.W.N. 25.
32 See Herrmann v. Canadian Nickel Co. Ltd. (1929), 64 O.L.R. 190, at 
pp. 193-4.
33 Ibid., at p. 194.
34 e.g., The Corporations Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 71, ss. 22 (1) (m) and (n).
35 e.g., The Companies Act, R.S.P.E.I., 1951, c. 26, ss. 13 (m) and (q).
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The incidental doctrine was also used as a means o f circum vent­
ing the prohibition against the purchase o f shares. The purchase o f 
shares was a  valid exercise o f a  general investment power36 as well 
as being valid under a general power to dispose o f property for such 
consideration as the directors thought proper.37
Since the basic legal problem was to be found in the limitations 
in the corporate objects, the practice developed to draft very broad 
objectives and include every conceivable power tha t the corporation 
might a t some time wish to pursue. The list has become formidable. 
Specifically, to alleviate the problems relating to corporate mergers 
and acquisitions, the memorandum  o f association often included as 
corporate objects: the nower to  buy and sell property; to  acquire 
the undertaking o f another com pany; to dispose o f its own under­
taking, particularly for shares in another com pany; and to hold 
shares or securities o f any other company. Prima facie , a t least, they 
appeared to solve the ultra vires problem — if they were valid cor­
porate objects.
While the practice of transm uting corporate powers to corporate 
objectives has been criticized, the legality o f the basic notion never 
appears to have been questioned.38 At most, the courts limited the 
scope o f ancillary powers by application o f the ejusdem generis rule 
to the scope o f the main objects.39 Individually, they were not 
immune from  attack.
Most im portant was the striking down of the power to sell the 
undertaking as a corporate object.
Under the Companies Act, 1862, the incorporation of a company is 
effected by the registration of a memorandum of association which 
is to state the ‘objects for which the proposed company is to be 
established’. To my mind that means the objects which the corpora­
tion during its corporate life is to pursue, the purposes by whose 
fulfilment it is to seek to earn p ro fit. . .  [These w ords]. . .  have, in 
my opinion, no relation to acts to  be done after the corporate life 
has come to an end.
Sale of even all the property at a particular moment may be, but sale 
of the whole undertaking and division of the proceeds cannot be, a 
corporate object.40
The other provisions fared better. The power to purchase an 
undertaking was upheld and often a com pany was incorporated for 
this specific purpose.41 Also upheld was the power to purchase
36 In re Barned's Banking Company (1867), L.R. 3 Ch. App. 105.
37 H. A. Street, The Doctrine o f llltra Vires (1930), at p. 74.
38 See Bell Houses Ltd. v. City Walls Property Ltd., [1966] 2 All E.R. 674.
39 Gower, Modern Company Law (2nd ed., 1957), at p. 84.
40 Bisgood v. Henderson's Transvaal Est. Ltd., [1908] 1 Ch. 743, at pp. 757 
and 761 (C.A.).
41 Ernest v. Nicholls (1857), 6 H.L.C. 401, 10 E.R. 1351.
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shares in another company.42 “ There is not, either by the com m on 
or statute law, anything to prohibit one trading corporation from  
taking or accepting shares in another trading corporation. There 
may, o f course, be circumstances which prohibit o r render it im ­
proper for a com pany to do so, having regard to its own constitution 
as defined by its mem orandum  and articles.”43
In sum, the courts and the bar circumvented the doctrine o f 
ultra vires. Obviously it had “ outlived its usefulness” .44 Mergers and  
acquisitions which were formerly prohibited were now possible.
Enactment o f Ancillary and Incidental Powers
The formidable list o f ancillary and incidental powers form erly 
found in corporate charters is now conferred by statute in m ost 
jurisdictions45, unless the incorporating charter otherwise expressly 
excludes any o f them. The purpose of this statutory enactm ent is 
two-fold. It eliminates the necessity of drafting prolix corporate 
objects and it finally resolves the disputes over the validity o f co r­
porate powers as corporate objects. A summary o f the powers 
relating to mergers and acquisitions will be found in Table A.
They permit mergers and acquisitions by purchase and sale o f  
assets, purchase o f  shares, and in some jurisdictions, by am alga­
m ation.
A Special Status fo r Letters Patent Companies ?
In six jurisdictions in Canada, companies are incorporated by 
letters patent. W hether the doctrine o f ultra vires has any application 
to these companies is a contentious issue.46 It is clear that prior to  
Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. R.41 it was generally thought 
that letters patent companies were subject to the doctrine.48 In 
Newhouse v. Northern Light Power and Coal Co. L td 49 a com pany 
was not able to take over the undertakings of several other com ­
panies because the charter contained no provision enabling it to  do 
so. The transaction was therefore ultra vires.
42 In re Barned's Banking Company (1867), L.R. 3 Ch. App. 105; Royal Bank 
o f India's Case (1869), L.R. 4 Ch. App. 252; Canada Life Assurance Co. 
v. Peel Manufacturing Co. (1869), 26 Gr. 477, at pp. 486-7.
43 Royal Bank o f India's Case (1869), L.R. 4 Ch. App. 252, at p. 257.
44 Gower, Modern Company Law (2nd ed., 1957), at p. 93.
45 Newfoundland appears to be the sole exception. See The Companies Act, 
R.S.N., 1952, c. 168.
46 See, Mockler, The Doctrine o f Ultra Vires in Letters Patent Companies, in 
Ziegel, Studies in Canadian Company Law (1967), at p. 231.
47 [1916] 1 A.C. 566 (P.C.).
48 Robson, Company Law (1916), 36 Can. Law Times 861; Mulvey, Some 
Phases o f Canadian Company Law (1920), 40 Can. Law Times 832.
49 (1914), 29 W.L.R. 249.
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(b) to purchase or otherwise acquire and undertake all or any of 
the assets, business, property, privileges, contracts, rights, 
obligations and liabilities of any other company or any society, 
firm or person carrying on any business that the company is 
authorized to carry on, or possessed of property suitable for 
the purposes of the company;
(1) (c) (1) (c) (D (b) (1
(d) to am algam ate. . .  with any other company or any society, 
firm or person, carrying on or engaged in or about to carry on 
or engage in any business or transaction that the company is 
authorized to carry on or engage in , . . .  ;
(e) to take, or otherwise acquire and hold, shares, debentures or 
other securities of any other company having objects altogether 
or in part similar to those of the com pany,. . .  and to sell or 
otherwise deal with the same;





(h) to promote any other company or companies for the purpose 
of acquiring or taking over all or any of the property and 
liabilities of the com pany,. . .  ;
(D (m ) (D (m ) (D (j) (1
(m) to sell or dispose of the undertaking of the company or any 
part thereof for such consideration as the company may think 
fit, and in particular for shares, debentures or securities of any 
other company that has objects altogether or in part similar to 
those of the company;





(s) to sell, improve, manage, develop, exchange, lease, dispose of, 
turn to account or otherwise deal with all or any part of the 
property and rights of the company;
(1) (q) (l)(q ) (1) (s)
(in the ordinary 
course of its 
business)
(
(u) to distribute among the shareholders of the company in kind, 
specie or otherwise, any property or assets of the company 
including any proceeds of the sale or disposition of any pro­
perty of the company and in any other company belonging to 
the company, or of which it may have power to dispose, if 
either such distribution is made for the purpose of enabling 
the company to surrender its charter under the provisions of 
this Act, or such distribution, apart from the provisions of this 
paragraph, would have been lawful if made in cash;
(1) (D (s) (D (w ) (
(3) Nothing in this section shall prevent the inclusion in the letters 
patent or supplementary letters patent of a company of other 
powers in addition to or in modification of the powers men­
tioned in subsection (1)
(2) (3)
(4) Any of the powers set out in subsection (1) may be withheld or 
limited by the letters patent or supplementary letters patent of 
the company.
(2)
F O O T N O T E S :
1 Section 150 (1) reads: “ N otw ithstanding  anything contained  in its m em orandum , no public com pany shall take o r  acquire 
by purchase o r  otherw ise any shares in any o the r co rpo ra tion  unless expressly au thorized  in each such case by an  ordinary 
resolution o f  the com pany. A general m eeting o f  the com pany may by ord inary  resolution confer a general au thority  to  take 
o r  acquire shares, bu t such au thority  shall expire a t the next general meeting o f  the com pany, unless it is continued  by o rd ­
inary resolution passed thereat, w hether previous notice the reof has been given o r  n o t.”
2 A special resolution in N ova Scotia requires approval by shareholders representing a t least three-fourths of the shares.
3 See the first sentence o f  section ISO ( I )  o f  British C olum bia, supra.
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(1)(U) (3) (h) (DO-)7 (1) (s) (q) (s) (0 (v )
(3) (4) (2) 29 (3)
(2) (2) (0 (2)
4 Section 148 reads: “ N o corpo ra tion  shall sell, lease, exchange or otherw ise dispose o f  the undertaking  as an  entirety o f  the 
co rpo ra tion , o r  a substantial pa rt thereof, unless au thorized  so to do by special reso lu tion .”  A special resolution in M anitoba 
requires approval by shareholders representing a t least tw o-thirds o f  the shares.
5 A special resolution in O ntario  requires approval by shareholders representing a t least tw o-thirds o f  the shares.
6 A special resolution in the U niform  A ct requires approval by shareholders representing a t least tw o-thirds o f  the shares.
7 Section 22 ( I )  (r) reads: “ to  d istribute am ong the shareholders o f  the com pany in m oney, k ind , specie o r  otherwise as may 
be resolved, by way o f  dividend, bonus o r  in any o ther m anner deemed advisable, any property  o f  the com pany, bu t no such 
d istribution  shall decrease the cap ital o f  the com pany unless made in accordance with this A c t;” .
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However, Viscount H aldane’s startling decision in Bonanza 
Creek50 became a landm ark in the law o f letters patent companies.
In the case of a company created by charter the doctrine of ultra 
vires has no real application in the absence of statutory restriction 
added to what is written in the charter. Such a company has the 
capacity o f a natural person to acquire powers and rights . .  ,51
The decision would appear to  overrule Nexvhouse v. Northern 
Light Power and Coal Co. Ltd.52 and eliminate the necessity o f the 
enactment o f ancillary powers in these jurisdictions. Their enactm ent, 
however, has had a restricting rather than an expanding effect. The 
inescapable inference from such enactments is th a t the com pany 
was granted no power to  dispose otherwise o f its property.53 It 
would thus appear tha t all companies incorporated in C anada are 
in much the same position.54
Authorization and Procedure
Sale o f  Assets
The aim o f the legislators in enacting ancillary powers per­
mitting a sale o f the undertaking was mainly to  overcome the 
limitations imposed by the doctrine o f ultra vires. It was also to 
eliminate the repetition o f such powers in the incorporating docu­
ments.
It would appear probable that the wording corresponds closely 
to  tha t which was in common use in corporate charters at the time 
o f their enactment. In its simplest form, the ancillary power to sell 
the undertaking reads:
A company may . . .  sell or dispose of the undertaking of the 
company or any part thereof for such consideration as the company 
may think fit, and in particular for shares, debentures or securities 
of any other company that has objects altogether or in part similar 
to  those of the c o m p a n y  ;55
Because o f its limited aims, there was no need to provide for 
any procedure or special authorization. In fact, the contrary was 
probably intended. Subject to special statutory restrictions, and, in 
the case o f companies incorporated by m em orandum  o f association, 
to provisions in the articles, the affairs o f a com pany are managed
50 [1916] 1 A.C. 566 (P.C.).
51 Ibid., at pp. 583-4.
52 (1914), 29 W.W.R. 249.
53 Stanishewski v. Tkachuk, [1955] O.R. 667, at p. 683 (Ont., Sup. Ct.).
54 See Mockler, The Doctrine o f Ultra Vires in Letters Patent Companies, 
in Ziegel, Studies in Canadian Company Law (1967), at p. 231.
55 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 14 (1) (m).
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by the board o f directors.56 Generally, incidental and ancillary powers 
conferred on a company are intended to be exercisable by the board. 
A fortiori, in the absence o f a contrary provision, the board of 
directors may sell the undertaking.57
Some theorists58 doubt the wisdom o f  selling the undertaking 
pursuant to an authorization solely from the board o f  directors. 
While some o f their reasons are not clear, their doubts are not w ithout 
some merit. First, there is an interrelationship between the ancillary 
power and other statutory provisions, e.g., an am algam ation or 
reconstruction which requires special authorization. This will be 
discussed later.59
Secondly, the transaction may be between companies with inter­
locking directors. Should the attainm ent o f a disinterested quorum 
be impossible, the m atter must be taken to the shareholders for 
ratification.60 This is part o f the more general problem o f  contracts 
with interested directors. It hardly necessitates shareholder approval 
in all cases.61 Where shareholder approval is required for this 
reason, approval by a majority will suffice.62
Finally, notwithstanding abundant authority  to the contrary,63 
there is some authority that directors are appointed to carry on an 
undertaking and, therefore, a sale by them o f the undertaking, bring­
ing the com pany to the point where there would be nothing left to 
do but to wind it up, is not within their power.64 Put another way, 
it is sometimes thought that the powers o f the board o f  directors 
to manage the affairs o f the com pany are limited by implication to 
those matters which relate to the com pany as a going concern. The 
difficulty with this theory is that if the directors do not have the 
authority  then the shareholders must have it; however, shareholder 
power must be expressly provided for.
56 e.g., Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 84 (1).
57 Wilson v. Miers, Supra, footnote 29; Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter 
Syndicate Co., Ltd. v. Cuninghame, [19061 2 Ch. 34 (C.A.); Hovey v. 
Whiting (1886), 14 S.C.R. 515; Brown v. Moore (1921), 62 S.C.R. 487; 
Ellis v. Norwich Broom and Brush Co. (1906), 8 O.W.N. 25.
58 Fraser and Stewart, Company Law o f Canada (5th ed., 1962), at p. 121; 
English, Corporate Acquisitions—General Considerations, in Ziegel, Studies 
in Canadian Company Law (1967), at pp. 605-6.
59 Infra, at p. 32.
60 North-West Transportation Co. v. Beatty (1887), 12 A.C. 589 (P.C.); 
Garvie v. Axmith (1962), 31 D.L.R. (2d) 65 (Ont., Sup. Ct.).
61 See English, Corporate Acquisitions—General Considerations, in Ziegel, 
Studies in Canadian Company Law (1967), at pp. 605-6.
62 Garvie v. Axmith (1962), 31 D.L.R. (2d) 65 (Ont., Sup. Ct.).
63 Cases cited, supra, footnote 57.
64 Doyle v. Miniota Mutual Fire Insurance Co., [1924] 2 D.L.R. 471, at p. 478 
(Man., C.A.).
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On the other hand, from a policy position, shareholder approval 
should be required. A part from advantages o f limited liability and 
favourable tax considerations, the corporation provides a structure 
with continuity, centralization o f authority, and transferability o f 
interests. A sale o f assets may be such as to substantially alter any 
or all o f these latter corporate characteristics. Considered as a 
m atter o f policy, such a transaction raises the issue o f whether it is 
a question o f management or ownership. If the latter position is 
taken, authorization should be vested in the shareholders.
Four provinces follow this philosophy.65 Their ancillary power 
provisions permitting the sale o f the undertaking mandates a special 
resolution passed by the shareholders. A “ special resolution” means 
“a resolution passed by the directors and confirmed with or without 
variation by at least two-thirds o f the votes cast at a general meeting 
o f the shareholders . . .’,66 Nova Scotia requires three-quarters.67
In Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island the efficacy o f the 
provisions may be illusory. We have already seen that the ancillary 
powers were enacted to partially abrogate the doctrine o f ultra vires. 
In furtherance o f this objective, it was common to expressly allow 
addition o f other powers or modification o f the statutory powers in 
the incorporating documents. This was intended to be permissive 
and not m andatory. In Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island the 
ancillary powers are still subject to such additions and modifica­
tions.68 If such provisions were construed literally, all provisions 
requiring shareholder approval in the ancillary powers could thus be 
eliminated in the corporate charter o r m emorandum in those prov­
inces. In contrast, in O ntario the ancillary powers may only be 
limited or withheld.69
In sum, as a starting point, the board o f directors may sell the 
undertaking. Some jurisdictions require shareholder approval, and 
there may be other reasons necessitating shareholder ratification. It 
is submitted that as a m atter o f policy, all companies Acts should 
require shareholder approval to sell the undertaking.70
A sale o f the undertaking still leaves the corporate shell and 
the consideration received in the possession o f the corporation. The 
corporation has the choice o f winding up, continuing as a holding
65 Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and see also, 
Uniform Companies Act. See Table B, at p. 49, infra.
66 e.g.. The Corporations Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 71, s. 1 (j).
67 The Companies Act, R.S.N.S., 1954, c. 41, s. 75.
68 The Companies Act, R.S.N.S., 1954, c. 41, s. 24 (4); The Companies Act, 
R.S.P.E.I., 1951, c. 26, s. 13 (2); See Table A, supra.
69 The Corporations Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 71, s. 22(2).
70 The Companies Act (1964), 13 Eliz. II, c. 3, s. 148 (Man.).
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com pany, o r commencing business anew. Usually its fate is pre­
determined by the contract o f sale o f the undertaking. If  the con­
sideration received is cash, the purchasing com pany probably will 
require a restrictive competition covenant which will make com ­
mencing a new and similar business impractical. The corporate 
objects, while amendable, may restrict other activities. In many cases 
winding up will be the most practical course.71 If shares are received 
the purchaser will probably not want a substantial block o f its shares 
held in one name for fear o f a threat to  the control o f the purchaser. 
The purchase agreement may require the vendor to be wound up 
and the shares distributed to the shareholders o f the vendor. To 
facilitate these aims, most companies may:
. . .  distribute among the shareholders of the company in kind, specie 
or otherwise, any property or assets of the company including any 
proceeds of the sale or disposal of any property of the company and 
in particular any shares, debentures, or other securities of or in any 
other company belonging to the company, or of which it may have 
power to dispose, if either such distribution is made for the purpose 
of enabling the company to surrender its charter under the provisions 
of this Act, or such distribution, apart from the provisions of this 
paragraph, would have been lawful if made in cash;72
The dissolution and liquidation o f a company may be affected 
by surrender, forfeiture, expiration o f the corporate charter, o r.by  
winding up. In sale o f assets, any one o f them may be possible. 
However, it is most probable that dissolution will be effected by a 
surrender o f the charter o r by a winding up of the company.
Amalgamation or Reconstruction
Earlier7̂  it was indicated that there is an inter-relationship 
between the ancillary powers and other statutory provisions, e.g., 
an am algam ation o r reconstruction which requires special au tho r­
ization. Most companies acts in Canada provide for special p ro ­
cedures where an arrangem eni or compromise between shareholders 
and creditors is intended.74 The word “ arrangem ent” is defined to 
include “ am algam ation o r reconstruction” . This latter expression 
means:
an arrangement pursuant to  which a company ( . . .  called ‘the trans­
feror company’) transfers or sells or proposes to transfer or sell to
71 But cf., Dominion Cotton Mills Company Ltd. v. Amyot, [1912] A.C. 546 
(P.C.) (long term lease of all the assets of the company).
72 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 14 (1) (u).
73 Supra, at p. 30.
74 R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, ss. 126, 127; R.S.A., 1955, c. 53. ss. 139, 140; R.S.B.C., 
1960, c. 67, ss. 179, 180; (1964), 13 Eliz. I!, c. 3, ss. 107, 108 (M an.); 
R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 33, s. 47; R.S.N , 1952, c. 168, ss. 126A, 126B, 126C; 
R.S.N.S., 1967, c. 42, ss. 117, 118; R.S.O., 1960, c. 71, s. 95; R.S.Q.,
1964, c. 271, ss. 46, 47; R.S.S., 1965, c. 131, ss. 187, 188.
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any other company ( . . .  called ‘the transferee company’), the whole 
or a substantial part of the business and assets of the transferor 
company for a consideration consisting in whole or in part of shares, 
debentures or other securities of the transferee company and, either, 
any part of such consideration is proposed to be distributed among 
shareholders of the transferor company of any class, or the transferor 
company proposes to cease carrying on the business or part of its 
business so sold or transferred or proposed to be sold and trans­
ferred.
Broadly, the provision distinguishes mergers from acquisitions. 
However, the definition appears to subject only the nominal vendor 
to the arrangem ent and compromise provisions. Thus the problems 
o f de facto  “am algam ations or reconstructions” are neglected.76 
There are no cases dealing directly with this point in C anada. It is 
submitted that if the purpose o f the section is to be achieved, the 
de facto  merger doctrine could and should, in the proper circum ­
stances, be applied. Thus, where nominally the com pany is the 
purchaser, if sufficient control is transferred to the vendor, it would, 
for purposes o f the arrangem ents and compromises provisions, be 
a vendor. Alternatively, the definition o f “ am algam ation or re­
construction” could be read not to be exclusive and to include such 
transactions.
If the transaction is an  “ am algam ation or reconstruction” , the 
vendor company must (1) obtain an order from a judge summoning 
a meeting of shareholders to consider the same; (2) obtain the 
approval o f shareholders representing three-fourths of the shares; 
(3) have the arrangem ent o r compromise sanctioned by a judge, 
having first given notice of such application to all dissenting share­
holders; and (4) have it confirmed by supplementary letters patent.77
The purpose o f requiring an application to be made to a judge 
for an order summoning a meeting o f shareholders is not altogether 
clear. It appears to be an anachronism . Arrangements and com pro­
mises were first subject to special legislation in 1870.78 T hat legisla­
tion was intended for the benefit o f the company and its creditors. 
Summoning a meeting o f creditors by judicial order was a practical 
solution to the vexing problem o f calling a meeting o f creditors 
with authority to bind the entire body. Later, the provisions were 
broadened to include arrangem ents and compromises between 
classes o f shareholders, and, finally, to include am algam ations and 
reconstructions. The latter situations differ from the form er in one 
im portant particular. There already exists a means o f calling a
75 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 126(4).
76 See Farris v. Glen Alden Corporation (1958), 393 Pa. 440, 143A 2d 25, 
Supra at p. 19.
77 e.g., Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 126.
78 The Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Viet., c. 104.
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meeting o f  shareholders. Thus it is submitted that, but for the 
statutory provisions, a judicial summoning o f a meeting would be 
unnecessary.
It is not surprising that courts have found the powers o f  the 
judge at the preliminary application uncertain. To say that the judge 
has authority  to summon a meeting and to determine all matters 
tha t are fairly incidental to this purpose is not o f much help.79 His 
power appears to be limited to fixing the date o f the meeting and 
its chairm an and calling as many separate meetings as there are 
classes o f shareholders in order “ to secure full and frank discus­
sion“ .80 He may not determine any m atter that might affect the 
rights o f dissenting shareholders, e.g., the form o f notice of meeting81, 
the form o f proxy 82, o r the disclosure o f information.
Usually the preliminary application is made ex parte. Masten, 
J. A., in Re Langley's Ltd.** said that in special circumstances the 
judge may in his discretion require notice o f the preliminary applica­
tion be given to certain shareholders. It is difficult to envisage the 
special circumstances.
Meetings o f shareholders involve numerous corporate problems 
including notices, proxies, voting, and inform ation circulars. These 
problems are not peculiar to mergers and acquisitions and need 
not be discussed here. However, it should be noted that the plan 
must be approved by shareholders present in person or by proxy 
at the meeting representing three-fourths o f the shares voted.84
The third step is to have the proposed plan sanctioned by a 
judge. Notice o f this application must be given to all dissenting 
shareholders at the general meeting, unless the judge orders o ther­
wise.85 This application is the cornerstone o f the rights o f dissenting 
shareholders and the subject o f later discussion.86
Finally, the plan may be confirmed by supplementary letters 
patent which shall then be binding on the com pany and share­
holders.87 It appears that the company must make this application. 
The use o f the word “ may” is indicative o f the M inister’s discre­
79 Re Langley's Ltd., [1938] O.R. 123, at p. 128 (C.A.).
80 Ibid.
81 Re Langley's Ltd., [1938] O.R. 123 (C.A.); contra, Re Western Grocers 
Ltd., [1936] 2 D.L.R. 762 (Man., K.B.).
82 In Re Dorman, Long, [1934] Ch. 635. at p. 661; Re Langley's Ltd., [1938]
O.R. 123 (C.A.).
83 [1938] O.R. 123 (C.A.).
84 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 126 (2).
85 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 126 (3).
86 Infra, at p. 47 et seq.
87 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 126(1).
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tionary power to issue the supplementary letters patent.88 It has 
been recommended89 that the proposed supplem entary letters patent 
be submitted to the C orporations Branch o f the Departm ent of 
Consumer and C orporate Affairs for preliminary approval before a 
meeting of shareholders is called. The D epartm ent may propose 
changes which the company may not be able to effect without 
calling another meeting o f shareholders. The Departm ent may even 
prohibit the am algam ation.90
Confirmation by supplementary letters patent is a Canadian 
modification o f the Joint Stock Companies Arrangem ent Act, 1870.91 
Under that act the arrangem ent or compromise was binding on all 
creditors if the plan was sanctioned by the C ourt. The modification 
appears to have been intended to make certain that the incorporating 
papers correspond with the true capital structure o f the company 
after the transaction. Often in a reorganization between shareholders 
and creditors, the capital structure is considerably altered. In 
“ amalgamations and reconstructions" it is possible that no change 
will be required in the corporate structures. The purchasing company 
may have enough authorized but unissued shares to carry out the 
transaction, and, after distribution to the vendor’s shareholders, it 
may be desirable to retain the corporate shell o f the vendor. Supple­
mentary letters patent would still appear to be required to bind the 
company and its shareholders.
Purchase o f Assets
Procedurally, the purchase of an undertaking is the antithesis 
o f the sale. However, in terms of policy, in many respects they are 
similar. In mergers, the im portant consideration is the fusion—it 
should not be the procedure; in acquisitions, it is the de facto  
vendor—and should not be the nominal one. Canadian legislation 
has not recognized this. Generally the purchasing company is much 
less regulated than the vendor. Typically, corporations Acts in 
C anada provide as ancillary and incidental to the corporate objects, 
the power . . .
to purchase or otherwise acquire and undertake all or any of the
assets, business property, privileges, contracts, rights, obligations
and liabilities of any other company or any society, firm or person
88 Interim Report of the Select Committee on Company Law (1967), at 
pp. 1 to 3.
89 Fraser and Stewart, Company Law o f  Canada (5th ed., 1962), at p. 706.
90 C f, The Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1968, at p. 7, col. 1 (The Minister 
refused to amalgamate British American Oil Co. and Royalite Oil Co. 
under section 128A.).
91 33 & 34 Viet., c. 104 (Imp.).
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carrying on any business that the company is authorized to carry on, 
or possessed of property suitable for the purposes of the company;92
For the same reasons that the directors generally have the power to 
sell the undertaking, they also have the power to authorize a pur­
chase. However, as in the sale o f  assets, the possible application o f 
the de facto  merger doctrine or the existence o f interlocking director­
ships could necessitate shareholder ratification.93
In many circumstances the purchasing com pany will have to 
obtain shareholder approval to increase its authorized capital to 
carry out a merger. An increase in the authorized capital o f a 
company requires sanctioning by two-thirds o f the votes cast at a 
special general meeting o f shareholders.94 However, if the purchasing 
company has sufficient unissued shares, this provision provides no 
protection for shareholders.
Purchase o f Shares
Thus far we have only considered mergers and acquisitions 
proceeding from purchase and sale o f assets. We have already noted 
that mergers and acquisitions may take the form o f a purchase 
o f shares.
O f all the existing legislation affecting mergers and acquisitions, 
the power to purchase shares in another company has the most 
variegated history. Existing laws exhibit the fears o f untamed cor­
porate giants o f previous centuries, the presence and abandonm ent 
o f the doctrine of ultra vires, and some concern for the shareholder.
The Canada Joint Stock Companies Letters Patent act, 186995 
provided, “ No Company shall use any o f its funds in the purchase 
o f stock in any other C orporation.” At the same time, however, a 
company incorporated by a special Act o f Parliament could pur­
chase stock in another company if authorized by the incorporating 
acts o f both companies.96 This latter rule is substantially the same 
today for companies incorporated by special Act.97
92 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 14(1) (b); The Corpora­
tions Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 71, s. 22 (1) (b) refers only to the business of a 
person. The additional words “or company” were omitted in (1953),
2 Eliz. II, c. 19, s. 2 2 (l)(b ). However, the Interpretation. Act, R.S.O., 
1960, c. 191, s. 30 (28) defines “ person” to include “corporation” . See also, 
The Companies Act (1964), 13 Eliz. II, c. 3, s. 26 (1) (b) (Man.), and The 
Uniform Companies Act, s. 25 (l)(b ).
93 Professor English implies that there are no similar considerations restrict­
ing the purchasing company: English, Corporate Acquisitions—General 
Considerations, in Ziegel, Studies in Canadian Company Law (1967), at 
pp. 605-6.
94 e.g., Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 48.
95 (1869), 32 & 33 Viet., c. 13, s. 41.
96 (1869), 32 & 33 Viet., c. 12, s. 32.
97 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 194.
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The position of letters patent companies is opposite today. In 
1874 in O ntario, it was enacted that notwithstanding the prohibi­
tion, the purchase of stock could be authorized by a by-law confirmed 
a t a general meeting.98 O ther provinces" followed and Prince 
Edward Island still has retained the provision.100 The Dom inion 
Act was amended to allow the purchase o f shares if authorized by 
the letters patent or a by-law approved by two-thirds o f the votes 
cast a t a general meeting o f shareholders.101 A similar provision is 
still in force in Quebec.102 M ost letters patent jurisdictions now 
authorize the board o f directors,
to take, or otherwise acquire and hold shares, debentures or other 
securities of any other company having objects altogether or in part 
similar to those of the company, or carrying on any business capable 
of being conducted so as, directly or indirectly, to benefit the company, 
and to sell or otherwise deal with the same;103
On the other hand, several mem orandum  o f association juris­
dictions have been more restrictive. Nova Scotia requires a special 
resolution. In British Colum bia104 and Saskatchewan105 public com ­
panies are prohibited from purchasing shares unless authorized in 
each case by an  ordinary resolution o f the shareholders, subject in 
British Colum bia to a general authorization which must be renewed 
at each general meeting o f shareholders.
A summary of the authorizations necessary in each jurisdiction 
to purchase stock is provided in Table B.
Where the authority is vested by ancillary power, it was not 
intended that the power be used to act as a holding company. The 
ancillary power to purchase shares is restricted to securities in 
companies having similar objects to the purchaser. Should a con­
glomerate be intended, the acquisition o f shares in any company 
should be a principle object o f incorporation.
Once the proper authorization has been obtained, most o f the 
remaining questions o f corporate procedure are matters o f general 
corporation law. These include the possibility o f increasing the 
capital o f the purchaser and in some circumstances dissolving the 
acquired subsidiary.
98 (1874), 37 Viet., c. 35, s. 45 (Ont.).
99 (1875), 38 Viet., c. 28, s. 45 (Man.); (1885), 48 Viet., c. 9, s. 63 (N.B.); 
(1888), 51 Viet., c. 14, s. 63 (P.E.I.).
100 Companies Act, R.S.P.E.I., 1951, c. 26, s. 61.
101 (1902), 2 Ed. VII, c. 15, s. 35 (Can.).
102 Companies Act, R.S.Q., 1964, c. 271, s. 41.
103 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 14 (1) (e).
104 Companies Act, R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 67, s. 150.
105 Companies Act, R.S.S., 1965, c. 131, s. 151.
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A purchase o f shares, o r take-over bid as it is popularly called, 
has several advantages as well as disadvantages.
In some amalgamations between companies it is necessary that the 
concern which is in substance being taken over should be kept alive 
and the amalgamation should be carried through by a transfer of 
shares and not by a sale of assets. The reason in some cases is the 
necessity of preserving the goodwill associated with the name of the 
company taken over and other cases is that part of its property (e.g., a 
licence to utilise a patent assignable only with a consent which cannot 
be obtained) cannot be assigned. The acquiring company generally 
desires to obtain the whole of the share capital of the company which 
is being taken over and in some cases will not entertain the business 
except on that basis.
It has been represented to us that holders of a small number of 
shares of the company which is being taken over (either from a 
desire to exact better terms than their fellow shareholders are content 
to accept or from lack of real interest in the matter) frequently 
fail to come into an arrangement which commends itself to the vast 
majority of their fellow shareholders, with the result that the trans­
action fails to materialise.106
In order to alleviate “ opression o f the majority by a minority” ,107 
a provision was added to the English Companies Act in 1929 per­
mitting the purchasing company to compel minority shareholders to 
sell their shares, where an offer is accepted within four m onths by 
the holders o f 90%  of the shares affected.108 Com parable provisions 
were subsequently enacted in several jurisdictions in C anada.109
The Canadian provisions contem plate (I) a “contract” between 
the two companies; (2) “ approval” by the holders o f nine-tenths o f 
the shares affected within four months o f the making o f an offer o f 
purchase; (3) notice given by the purchasing company to “dissent­
ing” shareholders, within two m onths after the expiration of the said 
four m onths, o f its intention to acquire their shares; and (4) an 
opportunity for the dissenting shareholders to apply to a judge to 
prevent the compulsory sale.110
Procedurally, the provisions are vague.111 They call for the 
“approval” o f a “ contract” involving the transfer o f shares in a 
company (referred to as “ the transferor com pany” ) to another com ­
pany (referred to as “ the transferee com pany” ). It is difficult to
106 Report of the Committee on Company Law, Cmd. No. 2657 (1926), at 
para. 84.
107 Ibid.
108 Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. V., c. 23, s. 155.
109 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 128; R.S.A., 1955, c. 53, 
s. 138; R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 67. s. 181; R.S.N.S., 1967, c. 42, s. 119; R.S.S.,
1965, c. 131, s. 189; R.S.Q., 1964, c. 271, s. 48.
110 e.g., Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 128.
111 See Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Australian Newsprint Mills 
Holdings Ltd. (1961), 105 Commonw. L.R. 473, at p. 479 (High Ct. Aus.).
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visualize such a contract in the traditional sense. Presumably it 
means a contract between the two com panies.112 However, the trans­
fer o f shares is a m atter involving the transferee company and the 
shareholders o f the “ transferor” com pany, not the “ transferor” 
com pany itself.
The English and Australian Acts use the phrase “ scheme or 
contract” , the former being held to include typical take-over bid 
offers to shareholders where no agreement was previously made 
with the “ transferee” company itself.113 The word “ scheme” was 
omitted from C anadian legislation. Notw ithstanding its omission, 
similar offers in C anada have been held to be within the provisions.114 
The use of the word “ contract” in the English Act partly reflects 
the practice there. Often the purchaser first negotiates the offer with 
the directors o f the other company with the intention of securing 
their individual shares and a resolution by them recommending 
acceptance of the offer by all shareholders. This agreement between 
the transferee company and the individual directors of the “ trans­
feror” company, and sometimes including its major shareholders, is 
referred to as “ the contract” .115
It was not intended that “ approval” of the “ contract” be a 
corporate act. Instead, acceptance of the offer by shareholders 
representing 90 per cent o f the shares constitutes “ approval” . The 
acceptance authorizes the transferee company to give notice to the 
remaining shareholders indicating its intention to acquire their 
shares.
While it is clear that acceptance must take place within four 
months, it is not clear from the words o f the statute if the offer 
must remain open four m onths. The provision reads:
Where any contract . . .  has, within four months after the making 
of the offer . . .  been approved . . .  the transferee company may . .  .116
In Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co.117 it was decided that the offer 
must remain open four months. Locke, delivered the majority 
opinion:
In my opinion, the language of s-s. 1 . . .  contemplates that the offer 
shall be open for acceptance for the period of four months by those 
to whom it has been made . . . The intention of Parliament in provid­
112 See Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 204, at p. 212 (Rand J.).
113 Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Australian Newsprint Mills Holdings 
Ltd., (1961) 105 Commonw. L.R. 473, at p. 479 (High Ct. Aus.).
114 Cf., Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 204, at p. 212.
115 See Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Australian Newsprint Mills 
Holdings Ltd. (1961), 105 Commonw. L.R. 473, at p. 479 (High Ct. Aus ).
116 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 128 (1).
117 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 204.
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ing that such an application could not be made until 4 months after 
the making of the offer was . . .  to enable the shareholders to make 
such investigation as they might think advisable to enable them to 
determine whether the offer was fair and one that they wished to
accept.” 8
Rand, J., in a concurring judgm ent gave a different reason. The 
provision provides that the transferee company may, a t any time 
within two months after the expiration o f the said four m onths, 
give the notice. He concluded that for this to make sense, the offer 
must remain open four months.
Both in England119 and in A ustralia120 the courts have decided 
otherwise. In the former, W inn-Parry, J., could not accept the view 
o f Locke, J. There, the dissenting shareholder has “ very limited 
rights (if any) to further inform ation than that given in the circular 
setting out the terms of the offer” .121 Thus he found it difficult to 
a ttribute the intention o f Parliament to provide a period for in­
vestigating the merits o r demerits o f the offer.122 “ W ithin four 
m onths” fixed the maximum period in which the offer must be 
accepted, not the minimum, as held by Rand, J. “The critical 
moment for ascertaining whether the obligation thrown on the 
transferee company . .  . has arisen cannot possibly be the expiration 
o f a fixed period, but must be that moment o f time when the condi­
tion is fulfilled . . . [i.e. 90%  shares acquired].” 123
The judgm ent o f W inn-Parry, J., has merit. Insuring adequate 
investigation as proposed by Locke, J., would be better achieved 
by maintaining a high standard of disclosure. Forcing a company 
to hold out its offer for four m onths does appear to be unduly long, 
especially since the general regulation of take-over bids requires it 
be open only twenty-one days.124 However, his view that dissenting 
shareholders generally have very limited rights is w ithout merit.
More generally, the difference in opinions reflects a difference 
in attitude between English and Canadian courts towards the rights 
o f dissenting shareholders. In C anada, the company must strictly 
comply with the procedures set ou t.125 In five o f the six reported 
cases interpreting the provisions, the transferee com pany lost its
118 Ibid., at p. 210.
119 Re Western Manufacturing (Reading) Ltd., [1956] 1 Ch. 436.
120 Lewis Emanuel & Son Ltd. v. Lombard Australia Ltd., [1963] N.S.W. 38 
(Sup. Ct.).
121 Re Western Manufacturing (Reading) Ltd., [1956] 1 Ch. 436, at p. 446.
122 Ibid., at p. 448.
123 Ibid., at p. 449.
124 The Securities Act (1966), 14 & 15 Eliz. II, c. 142, s. 81 (1) (Ont.).
125 Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 204, at p. 209.
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rights by non-compliance.126 The sixth case was referred to the trial 
court to be decided on the merits.127 In C anada, the legislation has 
been called “ drastic in the extreme” 128 and “ confiscatory” .129 Laid- 
law, J. A., could not satisfy himself as to the true purpose o f the 
legislation.130
In addition, even where the court finds in favour of the com ­
pany, dissenting shareholders are usually awarded costs.131 They 
have a right to an expression o f opinion from the C ourt.132
“ One significant difference between the English and Canadian 
Acts is that the English Act provides that in computing the nine- 
tenths o f the shares affected, there shall not be included ‘shares 
already held at the date o f the offer by, o r by a nominee for, the 
transferee company or its subsidiary’ ” .133 The inevitable conclusion 
has been that the section contemplates the acquisition o f 90 per cent 
o f the total issued shares independently held.134
N or may the provisions be used to “ squeeze ou t” minority 
shareholders. In Re International Petroleum Co. Ltd .,l i5 Standard 
Oil Company o f New Jersey owned all the shares o f Esso Standard 
(Inter-American) Inc. and 96 per cent o f the issued shares o f Inter­
national Petroleum Co. Ltd. Esso S tandard’s offer to purchase all 
the capital stock o f International was accepted by Standard Oil.
126 Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co., [1953] S.C.R. 204 (Noncompliance with 
the four month offering period requirement); Re Waterous and Koehring- 
Waterous Ltd., [1954] 4 D.L.R. 839 (Ont., C.A.) (Extension of a thirty 
day offering to four months not sufficient.); Re John Labatt Ltd., (1959), 
29 W.W.R. 323 (B.C., Sup. Ct.) (Notice to dissenting shareholders referred 
to the Companies Act, 1934 which had been repealed by the Companies 
Act, 1952 and therefore was a nullity even though the material provisions 
were identical.); Re International Petroleum Co. Ltd., [1963] S.C.R. 144 
(A subsidiary of the purchaser already owned more than 10 per cent of 
the shares and therefore the purchaser could not acquire 90 per cent of the 
shares within four months.); Re Canadian Breweries Ltd., [1964] Que.
C.S. 600 (acquisition extended beyond four months).
127 In re Canadian Food Products Limited and Picardv Limited, [1945] 3 D.L.R.
287 (Man., C.A.).
128 Ibid., at p. 290.
129 Re John Labatt Ltd. (195Q), 29 W.W.R. 323. at p. 325 (B.C., Sup. Ct.).
130 Re International Petroleum Co. Ltd. (1962), 33 D.L.R. (2d) 658, at p. 667 
(Ont., C.A.), a f f ’d., [1963] S.C.R. 204; See also Re Hoare and Co. (1933),
150 L.T. 374, at p. 376 (Ch. D.).
131 Re Hoare & Co. (1933), 150 L.T. 374 (Ch. D.); Re Castner-Kellner Alkali 
Co., [1930] 2 Ch. 349; In Re Canadian Food Products Limited and Picardy 
Limited, [1945] 3 D.L.R. 287 (Man., C.A.).
132 Re Hoare A Co. (1933), 150 L.T. 374 (Ch. D.).
133 Re International Petroleum Co. Ltd. (1963), 37 D.L.R. (2d) 598, at p. 601.
134 Ibid., at p. 604.
135 (1963), 37 D.L.R. (2d) 598.
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Esso Standard then proceeded to acquire the shares o f the dissenting 
stockholders pursuant to the compulsory acquisition provisions. The 
Supreme Court o f Canada ordered otherwise, citing Re Bugle 
Press Lid .136
Even, therefore, though the present case does fall strictly within the 
terms of section 209, the fact that the offeror, the transferee company, 
is for all practical purposes entirely equivalent to the nine-tenths of 
the shareholders who have accepted the offer, makes it in my judgment 
a case in which, for the purposes of exercising the court’s discretion, 
the circumstances are special—a case, therefore, of a kind contem­
plated by Maugham J. to which his general rule would not be 
applicable. It is no doubt true to say that it is still for the minority 
shareholder to establish that the discretion should be exercised in 
the way he seeks. That, I think agreeing with Mr. Instone, follows 
from the language of the section which uses the formula which I have 
already more than once read ‘unless on an application made by the 
dissenting shareholder the court thinks fit to order otherwise’. But if 
the minority shareholder does show, as he shows here, that the 
offeror and the 90 per cent, of the transferor company’s shareholders 
are the same, then as it seems to me he has, prima facie, shown that 
the court ought otherwise to order, since if it should not so do the 
result would be, as Mr. Instone concedes, that the section has been 
used not for the purpose of any scheme or contract properly so called 
or contemplated by the section but for the quite different purpose of 
enabling majority shareholders to  expropriate or evict the minority; 
and that, as it seems to me, is something for the purposes of which, 
prima facie, the court ought not to allow the section to be invoked—un­
less at any rate it were shown that there was some good reason in the 
interests of the company for so doing, for example, that the minority 
shareholder was in some way acting in a manner destructive or highly 
damaging to the interests of the company from some motives entirely 
of his own.137
The more substantive rights o f dissenting shareholders are 
sufficiently im portant to w arrant separate treatm ent.138
Statutory Amalgamations
The final procedure available to effect a  merger o r acquisition 
is statutory am algam ation. Statutory am algam ations are possible in 
all jurisdictions in C anada. Typically, legislation provides:
Any two or more companies, including a holding and subsidiary 
company, [having the same or similar objects]139 may amalgamate 
and continue as one company.14® (Emphasis Added)
136 [1961] 1 Ch. 270(C.A.).
137 Ibid., at pp. 286-7; accord., Re International Petroleum Co. Ltd. (1963),
37 D.L.R. (2d) 598, at p. 603.
138 Infra, at p. 47.
139 The requirement of similar objects is found only in New Brunswick, 
Newfoundland, Ontario, and Quebec.
140 The Corporations Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 71, s. 96 (1).
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The preceding provision was first enacted in O ntario and 
applicable generally in 1897,141 followed by Quebec in 1920.142 It 
was not until after statutory am algam ations were afforded preferred 
tax treatm ent in 1958143 that the remaining jurisdictions enacted 
com parable legislation.144
The companies proposing am algam ation enter into an  agree­
ment setting out the terms and conditions o f the plan which must 
then be approved by the shareholders. Some jurisdictions require 
the approval o f two-thirds o f the votes cast a t a general meeting, 
others, three-fourths.
Procedures designed to protect the rights o f dissenting share­
holders vary. In O ntario, after adoption o f the plan by the share­
holders, the companies may immediately make a jo in t application 
for letters patent confirming the agreement.145 On the o ther hand, 
in M anitoba the am algam ation agreement must be approved by the 
court,146 judicial review being intended to afford protection to 
dissenting shareholders. W hen the C anada C orporations Act was 
being am ended in 1965, “ representations were made . . .  [to] the 
Senate Banking and Commerce Committee that the M anitoba pro­
cedure placed an unreasonable burden upon the companies wishing 
to am algam ate” .147 A compromise was reached—rather than  require 
judicial approval, the C anada C orporations Act permits dissenting 
shareholders representing 10 per cent o f the shares in an  am algam at­
ing company to apply to the court for an order annulling the am al­
gam ation agreement.148 The order o f the judge is final and not 
subject to appeal.149 U nder both the M anitoba and Federal Acts, the 
am algam ation must also be confirmed by letters patent.
The scheme is deceptively simple. It is the concept o f continuity 
o f the am algam ated companies that distinguishes it from a sale of 
assets and purchase o f shares. In the latter instances, there can be
141 Ontario Companies Act (1897), 60 Viet., c. 28, s. 102.
142 R.S.Q., 1909, Art 5967f; 10 Geo. V, c. 72, s. 1.
143 (1958), 7 Eliz. II, c. 32, s. 35 (Can.).
144 (1958), 7 Eliz. II, c. 32, s. 35 (Can.); (1959), 8 Eliz. II, c. 10, s. 7 (Alta.); 
R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 67, s. 178; (1964), 13 Eliz. II, c. 3, ss. 110, 111 (M an.); 
(1954), 3 Eliz. II, c. 28, s. 4 (N.B.): R.S.N.S., 1967, c. 42, s. 120; (1960), 
9 Eliz. II, c. 8, s. 2 (P.E.I.): R.S.S., 1965, c. 131, s. 190.
145 The Corporations Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 71, s. 96 (3), (4).
146 Companies Act (1964), 13 Eliz. II, c. 3, s. 111 (4) (Man.).
147 Williamson, Federal Companies Act Amendments, 30 Business Quarterly 
(Fall 1965), at pp. 38 and 43.
148 The Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 128A (5), as amended 
by (1964-65), 13 & 14 Eliz. II, c. 52, s. 41.
149 Ibid.
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no fusion of corporate entities.150 A statutory am algam ation, on the 
o ther hand, has been described “as if two rivers join and continue 
as one” .151
The major difficulty attendant the continuity concept is to 
appreciate the full legal effect o f the am algam ation. Once confirmed 
by letters patent, “ the am algam ated com pany possesses all the 
property, rights, assets, privileges and franchises, and is subject to 
all the contracts, liabilities, debts and obligations of each of the 
am algam ating com panies.” 152
In The Stanward Corp. v. Denison Mines Ltd.15* the plaintiff, 
Stanward, conveyed eighteen mining claims in the Quirke Lake area 
to Can-M et Explorations Limited in consideration o f $300,000 cash, 
50,000 shares o f Can-M et, and a royalty o f $1.00 per ton for each 
ton o f ore mined from the eighteen claims, o r from fourteen other 
mining claims then owned by C an-M et,” or [from ] any other claims 
which [Can-M et] may acquire adjacent thereto” . In ’960, Can-M et, 
then in financial difficulties, am algam ated with Consolidated Denison 
Mines Limited, the continuing corporate entity being called Denison 
Mines Limited. Consolidated had owned eighty-eight claims that 
began approximately one-quarter mile from the Can-M et claims. 
One o f the issues before the court was whether the former Consol­
idated claims were, upon am algam ation, “ acquired” within the 
meaning o f the royalty agreement.
Gale, J., in the O ntario High C ourt,154 noted that nothing in 
the statute or letters patent provided that either o f the two com ­
panies am algam ated acquired the property o f the other. He con­
cluded that it could not be said that Can-M et acquired Consol- 
idated’s claims.155 However, the liabilities imposed by the royalty 
agreement followed C an-M et when it subsequently am algam ated 
with Consolidated and Denison “acquired” the claims.
While it may be that, for the purposes of the statute, an amalgamated 
company does not ‘acquire' the property which prior to the amalgama­
tion was owned by its amalgamating components, I am firmly of
150 Street, The Doctrine o f Ultra Vires (1930), at pp. 146-7.
151 Cudney, Company Amalgamations, [1958J Tax Conf. Report 30, at p. 35; 
See also, The Stanward Corporation v. Denison Mines Ltd. (1966), 52
D.L.R. (2d) 115, at p. 121.
152 e.g., Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 128A (13) (b), as 
amended by (1964-65), 13 & 14 Eliz. II, c. 52, s. 41.
153 (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 674 (Ont., C.A.), affirmed on other grounds [1968] 
S.C.R. 441.
154 (1966), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 115.
155 Ibid., at p. 121.
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the opinion that Denison did ‘acquire’ the Consolidated claims in the 
sense in which that word was employed in the royalty agreement.
Any other interpretation would establish the efficacy of the 
amalgamation procedure as an instrument of evasion and abuse.156
On appeal, K tiiy ,  J. A., after pointing out that he was not 
considering whether there could be enforced against the defendant 
a liability to which Can-M et was subject prior to  am algam ation, 
said that if Can-M et had assigned the mines to a third party, Can-M et 
would have remained liable if the third party mined those claims, but 
this would not have given the plaintiff a right to a royalty when ore 
was mined from the third party’s own claims because the terms o f 
the royalty provisions were not fulfilled. The royalty provisions were 
not changed by am algam ation.157
Section 96(4) of the Corporations Act declares, so far as relevant, 
that ‘the amalgamated company possesses all the property, rights, 
privileges and franchises and is subject to all liabilities, contracts, 
disabilities and debts of each of the amalgamating companies’. If the 
two companies, Can-Met and Consolidated Denison, continue as 
one, the statutory result that the amalgamated company becomes 
liable to pay the plaintiff any earned royalty cannot itself become the 
means of satisfying the agreement condition on which the earning 
depends, namely, that the tonnage be from the Can-Met group or 
from claims acquired by Can-Met. The amalgamated company, being 
‘possessed’ of claims brought in by the other ‘inseparable twin’, does 
not, as statutory successor or substitute to discharge the obligations 
of Can-Met, satisfy by such possession the contractual condition that 
the claims come from Can-Met. If the amalgamated company is a 
new company, the effect of its statutory succession to the rights and 
obligations of Can-Met cannot involve a change in the terms of the 
royalty provisions underlying the obligations which Can-Met under­
took. How can it be said that Can-Met acquired claims when it ceased 
to exist upon amalgamation or became swallowed up in a new com­
pany which at the same time swallowed up Consolidated Denison ?158
Kelly, J. A., is o f the opinion that the language is unambiguous 
in providing that the two am algam ating companies continue as one. 
While the exact metam orphosis taking place is uncertain, there was 
no acquisition by a new entity.159 The same conclusion was reached 
where a question o f liability for land transfer taxes was raised. 
There, any technical change in ownership was part o f the blending 
process o f am algam ation.160
The rationale also avoids the necessity o f a formal assignment 
o f contracts and leases. If assignability is subject to third party
156 Ibid., at p. 122.
157 The Stanward Corporation v. Denison Mines Ltd. (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 
674, at p. 679 (Ont., C.A.), affirmed on other grounds [1968] S.C.R. 441.
158 Ibid., at p. 680.
159 Ibid., at p. 681.
160 Re Quieting Titles Act (1962), 40 W.W.R. 182, at p. 184 (B.C., Sup. Ct.).
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consent, e.g., possibly with leases, this mode o f merger can be 
particularly advantageous.
In sum, the am algam ation procedure provides many o f the 
advantages o f a sale o f shares with the additional benefits o f one 
corporate entity.
On the o ther hand, The Stanward Corporation v. Denison Mines 
Ltd ,161 illustrates the inherent dangers accompanying the assum ption 
by the am algam ated company o f unknown risks. H ad tha t merger 
been by way o f a sale o f assets, it is doubtful the dispute would have 
been contested. As D arrell162 points ou t:
Freedom from responsibility for liabilities of the transferor or acquired 
corporation is frequently an important consideration in the eyes of 
the management of an acquiring corporation. When this is so, a simple 
clean-cut purchase of the desired property, leaving the transferor 
corporation with all responsibility for its own liabilities, has strong 
appeal.
The danger o f assuming criminal responsibility is less great. In 
R. v. J. J. Beamish Construction Co. Ltd.,16* Grey-W ellington Paving 
Co. Ltd. am algam ated under the O ntario C orporations Act with 
two other companies. Subsequently, Grey-W ellington, but not the 
am algam ated company, was charged along with eleven other com ­
panies, under the Combines Investigation A ct164 with conspiring to 
lessen com petition during a period before the am algam ation. Grey- 
Wellington was acquitted on the ground that it ceased to have entity 
or identity once am algam ation was accomplished. Jessup, J., further 
indicated that the amalgamated company had not assumed the 
liability:
‘Liabilities’ in s. 94(4) cannot be taken to include criminal liabilities 
which would involve ultra vires legislation by the Province on a 
matter of criminal law.165
There are often a num ber o f additional problems associated 
with statutory amalgam ations. There may be restrictions in existing 
loan indentures or other agreements upon mergers and acquisitions. 
The constituent companies may have labour contracts with different 
unions, and then there are the problems o f reconciling and meshing
161 (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 674 (Ont., C.A.), affirmed on other grounds [1968] 
S.C.R. 441.
162 Darrell, The Use o f Reorganization Techniques in Corporate Acquisitions 
(1957), 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1183, at pp. 1200-1201.
163 (1967), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 6.
164 R.S.C., 1952, c. 314.
165 R. v. J. J. Beamish Construction Co. Ltd. (1967), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 6, at p. 11, 
a f f ’d on other grounds (1966), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 260 (Ont., C.A.). Quaere: 
Whether the same result would follow if it were a federal amalgamation.
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deferred-compensation plans o f the corporations. Patent-licence 
agreements may prohibit merger o r acquisition, to mention a few.166
Summary o f  Legislation
A summary o f the legislation and required authorizations relat­
ing to mergers and acquisitions in C anada is provided in Table B.
The obvious inconsistencies are a product o f spasmodic am end­
ments intended to update legislation tha t needed more thorough 
study. Many provisions date back to the nineteenth century. N ot 
only are there many inter-jurisdictional inconsistencies but there are 




On one side o f the transaction stands the majority, wanting to 
carry out the merger or acquisition; on the o ther sits the dissenting 
minority. To the majority, the contract may be an opportunity to 
“ cash in” or the beginning of grandeur; to the minority, “cashing 
in” may be forsaking future dividends or, in a merger, embarking 
on an unseaworthy ship bound for parts unknown. W hatever the 
reasons, the dilemma is a classic problem o f balancing o f interests.
Opposing the will o f the majority to manage the company is 
the will o f a minority that is being forced to accept the majority’s 
terms and conditions. At early com m on law the doctrine of ultra 
vires afforded full protection to dissenting shareholders. In most 
cases, the unanimous consent o f the shareholders was necessary to 
effect a merger o r acquisition, as has already been seen.
W ith the decline of the doctrine o f ultra vires, the pendulum 
swung to the other extreme. As a general rule, courts refused to 
interfere with the internal management o f the com pany, which now 
included mergers and acquisitions. The majority was supreme. 
Engrafted on this rule were several exceptions, the most im portant 
being that minority shareholders would have a right o f action if the 
transaction am ounted to fraud. Thus stands the com m on law today.
In terms of policy, neither extremity is satisfactory. T hat any 
shareholder could veto the majority is, in m ost circumstances, an 
unworkable proposition; that the majority should have near absolute 
control over the minority rings o f unfairness. Thus it is not sur­
prising that legislatures intervened. The first step was to require 
greater than majority approval, e.g., two-thirds or three-fourths of 
the votes. In Anglo-Canadian jurisdictions, minority interests were
166 See, generally, Darrell, The Use o f Reorganization Techniques in Corporate 
Acquisitions (1957), 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1183.
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further protected by requiring judicial review—a novel provision 
that, in effect, passed the basic problem of balancing o f interests 
back to  the judiciary with a conspicuous absence o f any direction. 
In contrast, most American jurisdictions have granted dissenting 
shareholders the right to have their shares appraised and receive cash.
Judicial Review
Various types o f mergers and acquisitions afford dissenting 
shareholders special rights, the most common in Canada being the 
right to judicial review. Typically, merger and acquisition procedures 
that grant minority rights require the proposed plan to be sanctioned 
by a court.
The concept o f judicial review in this form originated in The 
Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870.167 While the legis­
lative intent in requiring arrangem ents to be sanctioned by court 
order is not altogether clear from the words of the statute,168 it has 
achieved two beneficial results. It provided protection for creditors 
and shareholders by requiring notice to  them and a means of 
ascertaining if there had been compliance with the requirements. It 
also provided a degree o f finality to the plan. Judicial sanction makes 
it difficult to  annul the plan at a later date. In addition, the courts 
have read into their discretionary sanctioning power an obligation 
on their part to review the merits o f the plan. Most generally, this 
means the plan must be fair and reasonable.
The first obligation o f the court is to determine the legality o f 
the plan. Courts usually require strict compliance with the pro­
cedures set down.169
The fair and reasonable requirement has been applied in arrange­
ments and reconstructions,170 statutory am algam ations,171 winding- 
ups,172 and compulsory sales following takeover bids.173 Tradi­
tionally, procedure and the doctrine of precedent has kept each type 
o f transaction separate. However, a com parative analysis will 
accentuate the differing policies exhibited by each.
167 (1870), 33 & 34 Viet., c. 104.
168 See, supra, at p. 33.
169 e.g., Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co., [1953] S.C.R. 204.
170 Re Western Grocers Ltd., [1936] 2 D.L.R. 762 (Man., K.B.); In Re Provincial 
Apartments Ltd., [1936] 3 W.W.R. 327 (Sask., K.B.); Re National Grocers 
Ltd., [1938] 3 D.L.R. 106 (Ont., Sup. Ct.).
171 Fogler v. Norcan Oils Ltd. (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 508, at p. 514 (Alta., C.A.), 
rev’d on other grounds [1965] S.C.R. 36.
172 e.g., Winding-Up Act, R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 252, s. 3 (f).
173 Re Hoare & Co. (1933), 150 L.T. 374 (Ch. D.); In re Evertite Locknuts Ltd., 
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The basic consideration is whether the court, on the recommend­
ation o f a minority, should annul a majority approved plan. By 
applying the fair and reasonable test in striking down such a plan, 
the court implies that the majority has acted to their detriment. 
The onus o f proof is on the dissenting shareholders, “ for the large 
preponderance of shareholders who accepted the offer affords cogent 
evidence that the offer was fair and reasonable” .174
The difficulties o f balancing interests are obvious and no really 
useful criteria have been developed. In England, under com parable 
provisions, courts lean much more in favour o f proposals than in 
Canada. Vaisey, J., put the test in these terms:
I think it rather difficult to predicate unfairness in any case in which 
there has been perfect good faith on the side of the person who is 
alleged to have been unfair.
A scheme must be obviously unfair, patently unfair, unfair to the 
meanest intelligence.
It must be affirmatively established that notwithstanding the view of the 
majority the scheme is unfair and that is a different thing from saving 
that it must be established that the scheme is not very fair or not a fair 
one: a scheme has to be shown affirmatively, patently, obviously and 
convincingly to be unfair.*75
In C anada, fair and reasonable means reasonable to  reasonable 
people conversant in the m atter.176 However, substitution o f the 
court’s opinion for that o f the majority in any given factual situation 
leaves the test obscure. For example, acting under the reorganization 
provisions, a proposal to convert preferred shares into com m on was 
struck down on the application o f a common shareholder who did 
not want to share future profits on an equal basis with preferred 
shareholders, even though the proposal meant cancellation o f a 
substantial arrearage o f  preferred dividends.177 The complicating 
factors were substantial holdings o f preferred stock by common 
shareholders and a recent change in the profit picture of the com ­
pany. On the other hand, a similar plan was not sanctioned on the 
objection o f a preferred shareholder on the grounds that he would 
lose his priority rights. M acD onald, J., stated, “ 1 cannot regard this
174 In re Canadian Food Products Limited and Picardy Limited, [1945] 3 D.L.R. 
287, at p. 291 (Man. C.A.) (compulsory sale following a takeover bid).
175 Re Sussex Brick Co. Ltd., [1961] 1 Ch. 289, at pp. 291—3.
176 Re Western Grocers Ltd., [1936] 2 D.L.R. 762, at p. 767 (M an., K.B.); 
In Re Provincial Apartments Ltd., [1936] 3 W.W.R. 327, at p. 331 (Sask., 
K.B.).
177 Re National Grocers Ltd., [1938] 3 D.L.R. 106 (Ont., Sup. Ct.).
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as other than confiscation o f some o f the property o f the preferred
c la ss ,. .  .” ‘78
It is clear that where a large portion o f the shareholders have 
special interests in the transaction, the cogency of their evidence is 
substantially reduced.179
Thus far we have only considered situations where the proposed 
transaction must be sanctioned by a court. These include arrange­
ments and reconstructions, statutory am algam ations, winding-ups, 
and compulsory sales following takeover bids. In the absence o f 
special legislation, mergers and acquisitions by purchase and sale o f 
assets o r shares may be effected w ithout dissenting shareholders 
having an absolute right to judicial review. The general rule is rule 
by the majority. However, a sale o f assets, and a fortiori, o f shares, 
may be set aside by an action brought by the minority on the grounds 
o f fraud. Since there is no requirement o f judicial sanctioning, the 
fair and reasonable test has no application.180
Judicial review is a poor means of affording protection to 
dissenting shareholders. The confirm ation—annulm ent alternative 
is too rigid to effect justice. One side wins or loses, leaving no 
room for compromise. The result is difficulty in finding standards 
that meet the practical necessities o f business. Rather than granting 
minorities the opportunity  to block the will o f the majority, the 
granting o f appraisal rights would seem a much better solution.
Disclosure
Closely akin to judicial review is the right o f shareholders to 
inform ation concerning the merger or acquisition. While advances 
have been made in recent enactm ents in securities acts, some general 
guidelines have already been developed by the courts.
A court presumes, when sanctioning a transaction, that business 
people are much better able to judge their own affairs than the court. 
Underlying this presum ption is the disclosure o f sufficient inform a­
tion to enable them to determine the fairness and propriety o f the 
plan before exercising their judgm ent.
No court can determine whether [a] merging transaction is fair and no 
shareholder can make a decision without having knowledge of all the 
facts which a prudent man disposing of one stock and acquiring 
another would require to weigh and consider before coming to a
178 In Re Provincial Apartments Ltd., [1936] 3 W.W. R. 327, at p. 332 (Sask., 
K.B.).
179 Re National Grocers Ltd., [1938] 3 D.L.R. 106 (Ont., Sup. Ct.); Re St. 
Lawrence Corp., [1948] 2 D.L.R. 107 (Que., Sup. Ct.); Re Canadian 
Cottons Ltd., [1952] Que. C.S. 276.
180 Garvie v. Axmith (1962), 31 D.L.R. (2d) 65 (Ont., Sup. Ct.).
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decision. The necessary facts will vary with the characteristics of the 
companies involved but in companies of the kind being dealt with 
here they may well include, for example, the following: book value 
for historical purposes, demonstrated earning capacity, liabilities 
current and long term, cash flow, provisions for depreciation and 
depletion, market activities, the speculative potential of the acreage 
of an exploratory company, proper estimates of reserves, and their 
marketability, as well as the benefits that might accrue to the share­
holders in the future operations of the merged company that would 
not be available if the companies were not m e rg e d .1 si
Full disclosure is required where a company (1) intends to 
force dissenting shareholders to  sell their stock pursuant to the 
compulsory sale provisions;182 (2) intends to carry out an am algam a­
tion or reconstruction;183 or (3) intends a statutory am algam ation.184 
Where judicial sanctioning is not required, as in a sale o f assets:
. . .  there not being, unless an action such as the present one is taken, 
any opportunity by the Court to consider the transaction, the notice 
of the special general meeting to approve the transaction should be 
all the more detailed and explanatory in its form.185
C anadian courts generally have not followed English decisions 
on disclosure. The latter have taken a very limited view o f the rights 
o f shareholders, especially in regard to the compulsory sale o f shares 
legislation. In re Evertite Locknuts Ltd .186 Vaisey, J., said:
1 have really no materials before me which will enable me to say 
either that any information with regard to that company was withheld, 
or whether, if so, it was withheld improperly. The difficulty I feel is that, 
if once it is conceded that a scheme of this kind can be upset merely 
for the reason that a shareholder is not given all the information which 
he might require or might expect from the directors of the transferor 
company, there would be no limit to the inquiry which would have 
to be set on foot as to the extent to which his demands for disclosure 
ought to be conceded.187
In contrast, Locke, J., in Rathie v. Montreal Trust Company188 
rationalized holding the offer open four m onths “ to enable the
181 Fogler v. Norcan Oils Ltd. (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 508, at p. 518 (Alta., C.A.); 
accord, Spence, J., dissenting, [1965] S.C.R. 36.
182 Re John Labatt Ltd., (1959), 29 W.W.R. 323 (B.C., Sup. Ct.).
183 Re Brazilian Traction Light and Power Co., [1947] 4 D.L.R. 736; Re A'. 
Slater Co., [1947] 2 D.L.R. 311; Re St Lawrence Corp., [1948] 2 D.L.R.
107 (Que., Sup. Ct.).
184 Fogler v. Norcan Oils Ltd. (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 508 (Alta., C.A.) rev’d on 
other grounds, [1965] S.C.R. 36.
185 Garvie v. Axmith (1962), 31 D.L.R. (2d) 65, at p. 86 (Ont., Sup. Ct.).
186 [1945] 1 Ch. 220.
187 Ibid., at p. 224; accord, Re Western Manufacturing (Reading) Ltd., [1956] 
1 Ch. 436, at p. 446; see also, In re Press Caps Ltd., [1949] 1 Ch. 434.
188 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 204.
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shareholders to make such investigation as they might think advis­
able to enable them  to determine w hether the offer was fair and one 
they wished to accept” .189 Obviously he was contemplating the 
availability o f some inform ation.
W hile C anadian disclosure requirements are more akin to 
American legislation than  British, the proxy rules o f the Securities 
and Exchange Commission in the United States must not be con­
sidered a useful guide. In Nor can Oils Ltd. v. Fogleri90 over 90 per 
cent o f the shares o f the Alberta company were owned by residents 
o f the United States and the shares were listed on the American 
Stock Exchange. To an allegation o f lack o f disclosure o f certain 
estimates, the company countered tha t the proxy rules promulgated 
by the S.E.C. prohibited the publication o f such inform ation, in 
reply to  which the court sa id :
. . .  no S.E.C. requirements or regulation should prevent share­
holders in Canada having proper notice of such an important matter 
when considering the proposed amalgamation.191
M ost o f the cases exemplify the difficulties in form ulating 
guidelines for disclosure in the absence o f specific legislation. With 
the enactm ent o f securities legislation specifically regulating take­
over bids and the content o f inform ation circulars, one might argue 
that the corporate requirements are also delimited. However, it 
would probably be an error to so restrict the development o f the law.
Other Minority Rights
It has been suggested that appraisal rights are a more effective 
remedy than judicial review.192 In some jurisdictions, when a private 
company intends to sell the undertaking or amalgamate, dissenting 
shareholders may require the com pany to purchase its shares at a 
price agreed upon or determined by the court.193 A possible explana­
tion for restricting the provision to private companies was the belief 
that if a shareholder o f a public company dissented, he could sell 
his shares in the open m arket.194 However, many public companies, 
especially those traded in the over-the-counter market in C anada, 
have few prospective purchasers.
189 ibid., at p. 210; Re John Labatt Ltd. (1959), 29 W.W.R. 323 (B.C., Sup. Ct.) 
(Manson J. refused to compel the sale of shares because, inter alia, there 
was not full disclosure.).
190 (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 508 (Alta., C.A.); rev’d on other grounds [1965]
S.C.R. 36.
191 [1965] S.C.R. 36, at p. 50 (Spence J. dissenting).
192 Supra, at p. 52.
193 e.g., The Corporations Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 71, s. 99.
194 MacKinnon, The Protection o f Dissenting Shareholders, in Ziegel, Studies 
in Canadian Company Law (1967), at pp. 507 and 521.
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In conclusion, it is subm itted that appraisal rights should be 
substituted for judicial review, as they are a better means o f balancing 
the interests o f opposing groups.
Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions
Confederation195
“ Confederation was conceived as the solution for a number of 
political and economic difficulties and, therefore, had both political 
and economic aims. Politically it was designed to establish a new 
nation to meet the changed conditions of British policy and to brace 
the scattered provinces against possible American aggression. Econ­
omically it was intended to foster a national economy which would 
relieve dependence upon a few industries and lessen exposure to the 
effects o f the economic policies pursued by the United States and 
G reat Britain.” 196 Politically, it was also intended to preserve local 
and cultural loyalties. “ Thus for various reasons, the builders of the 
new nation planned a federation comprised of a central government 
with authority over matters o f general and common interest and 
provincial governments with authority  over matters o f local con­
cern.” 197
The compromise, as embodied in the British North America 
Act, 1867,198 gave the provinces exclusive power to make laws in 
relation to matters coming within section 92 o f the Act. These 
included such matters as the establishment of hospitals, charities, 
eleemosynary and municipal institutions; the management o f public 
lands; the adm inistration of justice; regulating local works and 
undertakings, and property and civil rights in the province. The 
Dominion was given the power “ to make laws for the Peace, O rder 
and good Governm ent o f C anada, in relation to all matters not 
coming within the Classes o f Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively 
to the Legislatures o f the Provinces.” 199 By way o f illustration, this 
residual power was declared to include such matters as the regula­
tion o f trade and commerce; postal service; defence; navigation and 
shipping; fisheries; banking and the issue of paper money; savings 
banks; bankruptcy and insolvency; criminal law; and certain other 
topics primarily o f economic importance.
195 This section is based on 1 The Report of the Royal Commission on 
Dominion-Provincial Relations (1940), at pp. 24-36; see also Laskin, 
Canadian Constitutional Law (3rd ed., 1966), at pp. 1-6.
196 Ibid., at p. 29.
197 Ibid.
198 (1867), 30-31 Viet., c. 3.
199 (1867), 30-31 Viet., c. 3, s. 91.
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The general scheme was carried over into the power to incor­
porate companies. The incorporation o f companies with provincial 
objects was placed within the exclusive jurisdiction o f the provincial 
legislatures200 and a fortiori, the residual power was vested in the 
Dominion. For greater certainty, the Dominion was given exclusive 
authority over the incorporation o f banks.201 Mergers and acquisi­
tions are, at least in part, a m atter incidental to the incorporation 
power and, in part, a m atter o f property and civil rights. Legislative 
jurisdiction may follow similar patterns.
Questions o f Incorporation and Property and Civil Rights
Amalgamations and reorganizations affect corporate status and 
capacity; the constituent corporations became one entity with 
consequent changes in capital structure and management. At com ­
mon law questions o f corporate status and capacity are determined 
by the law o f the domicile o f the corporation, i.e., the place of 
incorporation.202 It would seem to follow that the incorporating 
jurisdiction has legislative authority over the am algam ation o r re­
organization o f the corporations it creates.
Corporate mergers and acquisitions by purchase and sale of 
assets or shares, on the other hand, do not necessarily affect corporate 
status and capacity. A sale of assets o r a takeover can be effected 
without alteration o f the status o f the constituent corporations. In 
the first instance the acquired corporation becomes a holding com ­
pany; in the latter, a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation.
The constitutional disputes usually revolve around the question 
o f whether the acquisition is a m atter o f incorporation and thus 
governed by the law o f the place of incorporation, or w hether it is a 
question o f property and civil rights and thus within provincial 
jurisdiction. Obviously, the question is academic where provincially 
incorporated companies are involved.
(a) Changes in C orporate Status and Capacity
The provincial power to incorporate companies is limited to 
those with provincial objects. A fortiori, there is a similar limitation 
on its power to regulate mergers and acquisitions, which is derived 
from its incorporation power. The meaning o f the words “ with 
provincial objects” are critical. Generally, when the constituent 
corporations have been incorporated in the same jurisdiction, the 
legislative power o f that jurisdiction to am algam ate or reconstruct 
the companies is beyond dispute. However, the British North
200 (1867), 30-31 Viet., c. 3, s. 92(11).
201 (1867), 30-31 Viet., c. 3, s. 91 (15).
202 Cheshire, Private International Law (7th ed., 1965), at p. 179.
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America Act203 has been a m ajor obstacle to interjurisdictional 
am algamations. If  the constituent corporations were incorporated 
in the provinces, they must have “ provincial objects” ; if they were 
incorporated in different provinces, can they then be amalgamated 
under one charter “ with provincial objects” granted by only one 
province?
The question is generally answered in the affirmative.204 Since 
Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co. v. The King205 the phrase “ with 
provincial objects” has been liberally construed, if not judicially 
“ repealed” . Prior to this decision, the meaning o f the phrase was 
the subject o f a heated controversy that is best explained historically.
The drafting of the exclusive provincial power has been traced 
by Professor Ziegel.206 Resolution No. 43, item 14 o f the Quebec 
Resolutions would have given the provinces authority over “ The 
incorporation o f private or local Companies, except such as relate 
to matters assigned to the General Parliam ent.” “ The wording was 
changed in the ‘revise’ stage of the first draft [of the British N orth 
America Act Bill t o ] . .  . read ‘The incorporation o f  companies with 
exclusively Provincial Objects’.” 207 Finally, the word “ exclusively” 
was omitted.
In 1910 the scope o f the provincial limitation was referred to 
the Supreme C ourt o f Canada.208 Several different interpretations 
were placed on the legislative power. In keeping with the general 
scheme o f the Act, one interpretation was that the power should be 
restricted to the incorporation o f companies relating to local and 
private matters within Section 92. Parliament alone had the capacity 
to incorporate companies to do business in two provinces.209 A nother 
view was that the words referred to the distribution o f legislative 
powers only and that there was no territorial limitations on prov­
incial companies.210 Still another approach would have permitted 
the province to confer on a company the “capacity to acquire rights 
and exercise their powers . . .  outside the province, so long as the
203 (1867), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3.
204 Ziegel, Constitutional Aspects o f Canadian Companies, in Ziegel, Studies 
in Canadian Company Law (1967), at pp. 149 and 191; Cudney, Inter­
jurisdictional and De Facto Mergers, [1964] Tax Conf. Report 29, at pp. 
38-41.
205 [1916] 1 A.C. 566 (P.C.).
206 Ziegel, Constitutional Aspects o f Canadian Companies, in Ziegel, Studies 
in Canadian Company Law (1967), at pp. 149 and 188-9.
207 Ibid.
208 In the matter o f the Incorporation o f Companies in Canada (1910-13),
48 S.C.R. 331.
209 Ibid., per Fitzpatrick, Davies, C.J.J.
210 Ibid., per Brodeur J., see also Idington, J.
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business when looked at as a whole as that o f an incorporated 
com pany (in connection, that is to say, with the capacities and 
powers o f the company so exercisable beyond the limits o f the 
province) is still a ‘provincial’ business. W hether in any particular 
case that is or is not so is a question to be determined according to 
the circumstances o f that case.” 211 Dissatisfied, the reference was 
taken to the Privy Council.
Lord Haldane refused to answer the question in the abstract 
fearing possible injustice to future suitors.212 He did refer to Bonanza 
Creek Gold Mining Co. v. The King,2[i having given judgm ent on 
the same day, where he said:
The whole matter may be put thus: The limitations of the legislative 
powers of a province expressed in s. 92, and in particular the limitation 
of the power of legislation to such as relates to the incorporation of 
companies with provincial objects, confine the character of the actual 
powers and rights which the provincial Government can bestow, either 
by legislation or through the Executive, to powers and rights exercis­
able within »he province. But actual powers and rights are one thing 
and capacity to accept extra provincial powers and rights is quite 
another . . .  The words “legislation in relation to the incorporation of 
companies with provincial objects’ do not preclude the province from 
keeping alive the power of the Executive to incorporate by charter 
in a fashion which confers a general capacity analogous to that of a 
natural person . . . What the words really do is to preclude the grant 
to such a corporation, whether by legislation or by executive act 
according with the distribution of legislative authority, of powers and 
rights in respect of objects outside the province, while leaving un­
touched the ability of the corporation, if otherwise adequately called 
into existence, to accept such powers and rights, if granted ab extra 214
Pursuing this reasoning, companies incorporated in different 
provinces may be am algam ated under the laws o f one jurisdiction, 
if the domiciles o f the constituent corporations both so provide.
The only legislation permitting interjurisdictional mergers is 
an adaption of the “ reincorporation” theory. Before the am algam a­
tion takes place, the foreign constituent corporations must all be 
reincorporated in the am algam ating jurisdiction. Thus, for a com ­
pany incorporated in M anitoba to am algam ate with a com pany in 
O ntario, one of the companies must be reincorporated in the jurisdic­
tion o f the other. Upon reincorporation, the laws o f the original 
jurisdiction cease to apply and the two companies being now under 
one jurisdiction are theoretically in a position to amalgamate.215
211 Ibid., at p. 401, per Duff, J.
212 [1916] 1 A.C. 598, at p. 602 (P.C.).
213 [1916] 1 A.C. 566 (P.C.).
214 Ibid., at p. 583.
215 Companies Act (1964), 13 Eliz. II, c. 3, ss. 112-113; The Corporations Act, 
R.S.O., 1960, c. 71, ss. 323 and 323a.
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The reincorporation theory has not always been fully accepted. 
W egenast216 objects to the possibility o f  a company being subject 
to two jurisdictions at one time, e.g., “ How could the second jurisdic­
tion alter the num ber o f directors, the name, the chief place o f 
business, the objects, o r any other item o f the com pany’s constitu­
tion?” 217 The interjurisdictional am algam ation procedure eliminates 
this element by terminating control by one jurisdiction upon re­
incorporation in the other.
There appears to be no constitutional problem respecting the 
surrendering jurisdiction. “ [T]he ‘accepting’ province is not trench­
ing on the jurisdiction o f the ‘giving’ province because it is acting 
with its consent. No delegation o f powers would appear to be 
involved between the two provinces; they are simply acting in 
concert.” 218
It would thus appear that via this circuitous route, interjurisdic­
tional am algam ations are constitutionally valid. However, the pro­
cedure has not been judicially tested and, in view o f the necessity 
o f certainty in corporate transactions, the procedure should be 
referred to the court for an advisory opinion.219
If the circuitous route is valid, the question naturally arises 
whether the provinces may do directly what is generally believed they 
are able to do indirectly, i.e., am algam ate interjurisdictional com­
panies. The New York Business C orporation Law provides:
One or more foreign corporations and one or more domestic coroora- 
tions may be merged or consolidated into a corporation of this state 
or of another jurisdication, if such merger or consolidation is per­
mitted by the laws of the jurisdiction under which each such foreign 
corporation is incorporated.220
A similar enactment would appear to be valid if enacted by Canadian 
legislatures.
Thus far we have only considered amalgamations between prov­
incial companies. Similar constitutional problems face an am algam a­
tion o f a Dominion and a provincial company. Enabling legislation 
was considered by the Senate Banking and Commerce Committee 
as part o f the 1965 amendments and subsequently deleted. “ It was 
feared that the constitutional doubts were so great that the Bill
216 Wegenast, The Law o f Canadian Companies (1931), at p. 112.
217 Ibid., at p. 113.
218 Ziegel, Constitutional Aspects o f Canadian Companies, in Ziegel, Studies 
in Canadian Company Law (1967), at pp. 149 and 191-2.
219 e.g., The Judicature Act, R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 120, s. 24A.
220 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, s. 907 (a).
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might be seriously held up in the House o f Com mons.”221 The only 
material difference in provincial interjurisdictional am algam ations 
and federal-provincial am algam ations is the ‘‘with provincial objects” 
limitation on provincially incorporated companies. Since a company 
may carry on business in more than one province, and, considering 
the ease with which objects can be modified, the fears seem un­
founded.
M ore generally, since the provinces and the Dominion have 
de facto  concurrent jurisdiction over the incorporation o f companies, 
an amendment to the British N orth America Act222 recognizing such 
would be more useful.
(b) Issues o f Property and Civil Rights
Where the merger or acquisition does not affect corporate 
status and capacity, theoretically the transaction may be a m atter 
in relation to property and civil rights in the province rather than 
in relation to incorporation o f companies. C haracterization of 
enabling or restrictive legislation will determine validity o f the 
transaction.
Historically, the provinces may not legislate in respect to 
Dominion companies so as to alter their status o r capacity or 
indirectly to sterilize them.223 However, in Lymburn v. M ayland224 
the Privy Council upheld the validity o f legislation requiring a 
Dominion company issuing shares to the public to use registered 
brokers in M anitoba.
Likewise, corporate contracts, and a fortiori a sale of assets, 
are subject to provincial regulation, being a m atter in relation to 
property and civil rights.225
Upon this landm ark rests the validity of all provincial regula­
tion o f takeover bids o f federal companies in the provinces.
Those who contend that the purchase o f shares in a Dominion 
company may validly be regulated by Dominion legislation usually 
argue that such control is necessarily incidental to the power to 
incorporate companies, and Parliam ent, having legislative authority 
to create companies, also possesses the legislative power to prescribe
221 Williamson, Federal Companies Act Amendments, 30 Business Quarterly 
(Fall, 1965), at pp. 38 and 44.
222 (1867), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3.
223 John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton, [1915] A.C. 330 (P.C.); Great West 
Saddlery Co. v. The King, [1921] 2 A.C. 91 (P.C.); Lukey v. Ruthenian 
Farmers' Elevator Co., [1924] S.C.R. 56; R. v. Henderson (1924), 51 N.B.R. 
346 (N.B.C.A.); A.G. Manitoba v. A.G. Canada, [1929] A.C. 260.
224 [1932] A.C. 318 (P.C.)
225 Citizens Insurance Co. o f Canada v. Parsons ( 1881 -82 ), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.).
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the m anner in which shares o f the capital o f such companies can be 
transferred and acquired. That m atter is said to be one o f general 
interest throughout the Dominion.226
Others argue that the purchase o f shares o f a Dom inion com ­
pany is a m atter o f property and civil rights in the province. The 
purchase o f shares is a transfer o f property tha t does not afreet the 
company. It leaves the company exactly as it was before. The sole 
connection it has with company law is tha t it is a share o f a company 
incorporated under the laws o f the Dom inion, that is, the chose in 
action in question.227
In regard to the first contention, the ancillary (necessarily 
incidental) doctrine is generally applicable when the provision in 
question is invalid per se as being legislation with an exclusive 
provincial head, but in its particular context, the provision derives 
validity because o f its necessity to effective legislation under an 
adm itted Dom inion head.228
Under this doctrine, the Dominion enactm ent o f compulsory 
sale legislation has been upheld. Its possible invalidity was first 
suggested In re Canadian Food Products Limited and Picardy 
Lim ited229 When the constitutional issue was properly before the 
court in Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co.,230 Coady, J., upheld the 
legislation, finding the regulation o f the transfer o f shares to be 
“ necessary incidental legislation and advantageous for the proper 
functioning of a company incorporated under the Dom inion statute 
. . .  which in effect provides a convenient way o f transferring com ­
pany undertaking and assets . . .  and if this be so the fact that this 
legislation may affect property and civil rights in the province is no 
objection.” 231 This view was later confirmed by the Supreme Court 
o f C anada in Esso Standard (Inter-America) Inc. v. J. W. Enterprises 
Inc232
In conflict with the Esso Standard Case is British Columbia 
Power Corp. Ltd. v. A.G.B.C.2ii In 1961 the Legislative Assembly o f
226 Esso Standard (Inter-American) Inc. v. J. W. Enterprises Inc. (Sub. nom. 
Re International Petroleum Co. Ltd.) (1962), 33 D.L.R. (2d) 658, at p. 665 
(Ont., C.A.), a f f ’d, [1963] S.C.R. 144; see also, Citizens Insurance Co. 
o f Canada v. Parsons (1881-82), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.).
227 British Columbia Power Corporation Ltd. v. A.G.B.C. (1965), 47 D.L.R. 
(2d) 633, at pp. 660-661 (B.C., Sup. Ct.).
228 MacDonald, Judicial Interpretation o f the Canadian Constitution (1936), 
1 U. of Tor. L.J. 260, at p. 274.
229 [1945] 3 D.L.R. 287, at p. 290 (Man., C.A.).
230 [1952] 3 D.L.R. 61 (B.C., Sup. Ct.), a ff’d, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 448 (B.C., C.A.), 
rev’d on other grounds, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 204.
231 Ibid., at pp. 69-70.
232 [1963] S.C.R. 144.
233 (1965), 47 D.L.R. (2d) 633 (B.C., Sup. Ct.).
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British Columbia undertook to reorganize the development o f its 
power resources. At the time, the m ajor power resources in the 
Province were owned by a private provincial corporation, the British 
Colum bia Electric Com pany Limited. This company owned and 
operated an electric power system, railway, bus, and gas lines. O f 
its nearly four million outstanding shares, all but fifteen were owned 
by the British Columbia Power C orporation Limited, a federally 
incorporated, public company. The shares o f B.C. Electric comprised, 
in value, between 90%  and 95%  o f the assets o f B.C. Power.
The plan of reorganization was to vest all the shares o f B.C. 
Electric in the Crown in right o f the Province o f British Colum bia,234 
and B.C. Electric was to be an agent o f the province.235 As com pensa­
tion, the common shareholders were to receive a sum equal to the 
paid-up value o f their shares. The subsequent claims o f injustice and 
unfairness o f the compensation led to an embittered battle. W hen the 
government refused to grant permission to the B.C. Power Corp. to 
institute an action under the Crown Procedure Act contesting the 
am ount o f com pensation, the C orporation instituted an action 
alleging that the legislation was ultra vires.
In early 1962 five interlocutory motions were heard, four o f 
which were appealed. While the appeals were being heard, two bills 
were introduced in the Provincial Legislature which later became the 
Power Development Act, 1961, Am endment Act, 1962,236 and the 
British Columbia Hydro and Power A uthority Act.237 By the Amend­
ment Act, 1962, the com pensation which previously had been fixed 
at approxim ately $110 million was increased to approxim ately $172 
million and designated “ as the full, fair, and adequate compensation 
payable” .238 The same Act purported to make the compensation 
final and conclusive and not open to question in any C ourt.239 The 
other Act purported to am algam ate the British Colum bia Power 
Commission (a Provincial Crown C orporation constituted under the 
Power Act240) and B.C. Electric into the new British Colum bia 
Hydro and Power Authority.241 In an attem pt to block any action 
by B.C. Power Corp., the Authority was not suable or liable to be 
joined in any action relating to the Power Development Act, 1961, 
or the Amendment Act, 1962.
234 Power Development Act (1961), 10 Eliz. II, c. 4, s. 3 (a) (2nd sess.).
235 Power Development Act (1961), 10 Eliz. II, c. 4, s. 6 (1) (2nd sess.).
236 (1962), 10 & 11 Eliz. II, c. 50.
237 (1962), 10 & 11 Eliz. II, c. 8.
238 (1962), 10 & 11 Eliz. II, c. 50, s. 2.
239 (1962), 10 & 11 Eliz. II, c. 50, s. 2.
240 R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 293.
241 (1962), 10 & 11 Eliz. II, c. 8, s. 3 (1).
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Before the last mentioned Acts were enacted, the B.C. Power 
Corporation applied for the appointm ent o f a receiver and manager 
o f B.C. Electric pending the action. On appeal to the Supreme Court 
o f C anada the application was granted, thus preventing the G overn­
ment from integrating the business o f the two corporations, B.C. 
Electric and B.C. Power Commission.
A t the trial Lett, C.J.B.C. held the legislation to be unconstitu­
tional. In a judgm ent that “ stands as a m onum ent to detailed 
diligence perhaps unsurpassed in C anadian constitutional litiga­
tion,” 242 he held that under the circumstances the federal company 
could not constitutionally be divested o f its shares in the provincial 
company. The legislation did not relate entirely to the incorporation 
of companies with provincial objects. W hile the vesting o f shares 
o f one owner in another ordinarily requires an entry in a share 
register, the corporate structure will remain the same regardless o f 
who owns the shares.243
To reconcile the B.C. Power and the Esso cases one would have to 
say that compulsory acquisition of ten per cent of company shares is 
a matter of incorporation of companies, but that compulsory acquisi­
tion of one hundred per cent of the shares is not.244
In summary, C anada’s constitution has restricted some types 
o f mergers and acquisitions. Interjurisdictional mergers which derive 
their validity from enabling legislation may be subject to  attack. For 
this reason, a simple purchase and sale o f assets may be desirable.
Taxation
Introduction
The prim ary aim  of the Canadian Income Tax Act245 is to levy 
a tax upon the income of every person resident in C anada246 accord­
ing to his ability to pay. Accordingly, marginal rates o f tax for 
individuals range from 11 per cent to 80 per cent. Corporations are 
taxed 21 per cent on the first $35,000 o f income and thereafter a t 
50 per cent. Because o f such high tax rates, a critical issue in the 
shuffle o f corporate organizations is the realization of income by 
one o r several corporations or their shareholders and possibly both.
Theoretically, for tax purposes, a distinction can be made 
between a merger and an acquisition and there is considerable merit 
in the argum ent that only in the latter should income be recognized.
242 Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (3rd ed. 1966), at p. 586.
243 (1965), 47 D.L.R. (2d) 633, at p. 661 (B.C., Sup. Ct.).
244 Strayer, Constitutional Aspects o f Nationalization of Industry (1964), 7 Cdn. 
Bar. J. 226, at pp. 228-9.
245 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148.
246 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 2(1).
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In a merger, the investments o f the shareholders are not realized, 
but change only scope. There has been no real conversion o f property 
in an economic sense. On the other hand, if the shareholders have 
“ sold ou t” , all the problems o f liquidation are in the forefront.
The most common problem in mergers and acquisitions is the 
taxation o f earned surplus. In many cases the corporation is the alter 
ego o f its chief shareholder, incorporated to obtain limited liability 
and the favourable tax rates afforded the corporation. The tax 
advantage is especially noticeable where an accum ulation o f earned 
surplus occurs. C orporate rates o f tax being generally lower than 
individual rates, there can be a considerable saving. However, on 
the declaration o f a dividend the problems o f double taxation 
extinguish much o f the advantage. Where the company with con­
siderable earned surplus later mergers or is acquired, the issue of 
earned surplus is again raised, either in the form of a deemed dividend 
or a non-taxable capital gain.
Surprisingly, most issues have been resolved with reference to 
the form rather than the substance of the merger or acquisition. A 
sale o f shares usually means a capital gain while a sale o f assets 
and liquidation often creates a dividend for tax purposes. Obviously 
the vendor prefers the sale o f shares; however, because o f a number 
o f other tax factors, the purchaser prefers to acquire the assets. An 
appreciation of the differences in taxation is indispensable for the 
planning o f corporate mergers and acquisitions.
The Purchase and Sale o f Assets
For tax purposes, a merger or acquisition by a purchase and 
sale of assets may be analyzed in two steps. First, there are the 
taxable consequences o f the purchase and sale as it affects both 
corporations, whether for shares, cash, o r otherwise. Second, there 
is the problem of distribution o f the proceeds to the shareholders.
(a) The Sale
M uch can be learned by analogy o f the sale o f a business to 
the sale o f an asset used for business purposes. Each involves study 
o f the capital cost allowance provisions, capital gains theory, and 
recognition of the terminal loss provisions. A sale o f assets purchased 
by the corporation at $100 and depreciated to $80 and subsequently 
sold for $130 will create taxable income o f $20, i.e., the difference 
between the original cost and the undepreciated balance. Put another 
way, the government recaptures the tax on the depreciation charges 
taken in earlier years. The balance o f $30 is a nontaxable capital 
gain.
It will be readily seen that where a corporation has propor­
tionally a large am ount o f substantially depreciated assets, a  sale
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of assets may not have favourable tax consequences to the corpora­
tion. On the other hand, it offers the advantage to the purchaser of 
a greater depreciation deduction than a purchase o f shares. Rather 
than carry the old charges forward as in a purchase o f shares, the 
assets are recorded at their new cost, $130. Depreciation is calculated 
on this am ount. In our example, it would make a difference o f a 
$13 deduction rather than $8 where the capital cost allowance was 
10% per year.
Where non-depreciable assets are involved, the problems of 
recapture are not present. Any gain would most likely be considered 
a capital gain. For the vendor, this is a highly desirable feature; 
however this is not desirable to the purchaser because he will be 
unable to deduct his expenses in future years for tax purposes. 
Thus, in an arms length sale o f assets, the apportionm ent o f the 
purchase price o f assets between depreciable and nondepreciable 
property may have im portant significance for both parties.
Thus, generally, the vendor and the purchaser will always have 
conflicting tax interests. Not only are there conflicts in the apportion­
ment o f the purchase price between depreciable and nondepreciable 
property but the conflict extends to alm ost every item on the balance 
sheet. Included in this list are accounts receivable, inventory and 
goodwill.
At common law, accounts receivable become gross income in 
the year in which they arise, subject to a subsequent deduction for 
such of them as later become bad o r doubtful. Prior to the enact­
ment of section 85D,247 upon the sale of the assets o f a business, 
including accounts receivable as part o f the sale o f  the business as a 
going concern, there was no allowance for tax purposes for any loss 
incurred on the sale of the accounts receivable, even though the 
loss had previously been included in income. On the other hand, 
the purchaser was not required to bring any subsequent change in 
the receivables into the com putation o f his income. Any such profits 
or loss were capital gains or losses.248
Section 85D makes it possible, if the vendor and purchaser 
agree, for the vendor to deduct the am ount o f his loss upon the 
sale of the accounts receivable and, in such event, requires the 
purchaser to include the same in its income, and then permits the 
purchaser to make deductions in respect o f such o f the accounts 
receivable as become bad or doubtful. In sum, the section permits
247 (1953-54), 2-3 Eliz. II, c. 57, s. 24 (Can.).
248 Crompton v. Reynolds & Gibson (1952), 31 Annot. Tax Cases 184 (H .I..): 
Abrahams [No. 2] v. M.N.R ., 66 D.T.C. 5453, at p. 5460 (Exch. Ct.); 
Woodlon Motor Sales Ltd. v. M.N.R., 55 D.T.C. 295 (Tax A. Bd.).
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the parties to elect ordinary rather than capital treatm ent o f accounts 
receivable.
To be entitled to the election, the vendor must sell all or sub­
stantially all the property249 used to carry on the business, including 
accounts receivable which have been taken into account in com put­
ing his income, to a purchaser who purposes to carry on the business. 
Literally, the vendor may be any person. However, such an inter­
pretation would open roads for tax evasion through transactions 
with non-residents who are not required to file income tax returns 
in Canada.250 “ Section [85D] is . . .  intended to afford a continuity 
in the treatment o f accounts receivable where the sale o f a business 
intervenes.”251
The sale of inventory presents similar problems. In the ordinary 
course o f takeover of inventory, gross receipts from sale are included 
in income. Prior to the enactment o f section 85E,252 on the sale of 
all the assets o f a business, the profit attributable to the sale o f the 
inventory was considered a capital gain. It was said not to be a sale 
in the business o f the taxpayer, but part o f a sale o f  the business 
and thus a capital gain.253 It was advantageous for the purchaser 
to place a high valuation on inventory in order that he might reduce 
his gross margin on sales in the first turnover period following the 
sale, thus reducing profit and consequent tax at no detrim ent to 
the vendor.
Section 85E was enacted to prevent the occurrence o f such 
valuations. It provides that on the sale of a business including 
inventory, the inventory will be deemed to have been sold in the 
ordinary course o f carrying on business. Any profit attributable to 
the sale of inventory is taxable income.254
A major difficulty in the sale o f a business can be the proper 
apportionm ent o f the total purchase price to inventory. W ith the 
enactment o f section 85E, the price apportioned by the purchase 
agreement is deemed for tax purposes to be the value if filed with
249 See Barnaby Paperboard Ltd. v. M.N.R., 68 D.T.C. 12 (Tax A. Bd.)..
250 See Office Overload Co. Ltd. v. M.N.R., 65 D.T.C. 290 (Tax A. Bd.).
251 Ibid., at p. 697.
252 (1953-54), 2 & 3 Eliz. II, c. 54, s. 27 (1) (Can.).
253 Frankel v. M.N.R., 59 D.T.C. 1161, at p. 1168 (Sup. Ct. Can.).
254 Kendon Finance Corp. Ltd. v. M.N.R., 63 D.T.C. 759 (Tax A. Bd.) (sale 
of business including conditional sales contracts at a price including 
unearned financing charges held to constitute taxable income); Raby v. 
M.N.R., 65 D.T.C. 5085 (Tax A. Bd.) (Sale of partnership interest in 
building project included $27,000 profit from the lots); M.N.R. v. Carlett,
67 D.T.C. 5058 (Sup. Ct. Can.) (profit on sale of second mortgage port­
folio considered to be inventory of money lending business).
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the M inister upon request.255 Otherwise the Minister has a discre­
tionary power to make an apportionm ent. The Minister, however, 
must act reasonably.256
Finally, if the sale o f assets including inventory alters marginal 
tax rates, the taxpayer may elect to average the proceeds attributable 
to inventory over the three preceding years.257
Any balance over and above the m arket value o f the assets sold 
is commonly referred to as goodwill. Goodwill is a non-depreciable 
capital expense, which is a capital gain to the vendor.258
In summary, the sale of assets is a taxable event to the vending 
corporation with considerable consequences to the purchaser. G en­
erally, the taxable treatm ent o f a sale of assets is more favourable 
to the purchaser than the vendor. However, there are several areas 
that are subject to agreement by the parties, e.g., accounts receivable 
and inventory and often they agree to split the tax costs in some 
way or other.
(b) Liquidation
After the sale, the vendor usually distributes the consideration 
received to its shareholders. The proceeds received by the share­
holders are characterized as a return of capital except to the extent 
the company has undistributed income on hand. The latter is deemed 
a dividend259 and defined as the aggregate o f the incomes since 1917 
less numerous items including losses, some non-deductible expenses, 
net capital losses, and dividends.260 Undistributed income in hand 
usually corresponds closely to retained earnings.
Dividends are taxed at ordinary rates subject to a 20 per cent 
tax credit.261 Where a corporation has substantial undistributed 
income on hand and the shareholder is in the 80 per cent marginal 
tax bracket, the sale o f assets procedure loses most o f its attractive­
ness, since he is taxed on this sum at a 60%  net rate.
“ The heavy taxation of corporate earnings and the high personal 
income tax rates early gave rise to a tendency on the part o f closely-
255 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 85 E (2).
256 Hersey v. M.N.R., 60 D.T.C. 528 (Tax A. Bd.) (Minister’s arbitrary 
acceptance of the purchaser’s valuation of inventory contrary to the 
original agreement of sale was erroneous); Thibault v. M.N.R., 63 D.T.C.
76 (Tax A. Bd.) (Minister erroneously included fixed assets in inventory).
257 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 85 E (4).
258 Jeffrey v. M.N.R., 50 D.T.C. 274 (Tax A. Bd.); Quenneville v. M.N.R.,
52 D.T.C. 108 (Tax A. Bd.).
259 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 81 (1).
260 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 81 (3).
261 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 38 (1).
held corporations to refrain from distributing their earnings to 
shareholders.” 262
The main difficulty with respect to undistributed surpluses 
arose upon the death of any of the principal shareholders of closely 
held corporations. Large succession duties on the estates of these 
shareholders frequently required the raising of large sums of money 
by estate administrators. Where other assets were insufficient, it was 
often necessary to declare a dividend in order to meet this demand; 
and the combined impact of income taxes and succession duties fre­
quently had been known to result in the confiscation of the entire 
share estate.*«
Parliament alleviated the problem by providing a procedure 
whereby the corporation may elect to pay a tax o f 15% on an am ount 
equivalent to undistributed income on hand at the end of the 1949 
taxation year plus all dividends paid since that date.264 The qualify­
ing sums less the tax paid may then be paid to the shareholders 
tax free.
These provisions apply where there is a winding-up, discontinu­
ance or reorganization of the business.265
The limitation imposed on post 1949 taxation years prevents 
the legislation being used solely as a means of paying out accumulated 
earnings at favourable rates. To be utilized to its fullest extent, the 
corporation would have to pay ordinary dividends equal to half its 
earnings since 1949.
The Purchase and Sale o f Shares
For the vendor, a sale o f shares instead o f a sale o f assets has 
many advantages. Unless he is in the business of buying and selling 
shares, the consideration received is a capital gain (or loss). All the 
problems of inventory, accounts receivable, depreciation, and, o f 
course, winding-up are avoided. All this is premised on the trans­
action’s being characterized as a sale o f shares.
In Merritt v. M. N. R.2(*> the boards o f directors of the Security 
Loan and Trust Company and the Premier Trust Company entered 
into a “ Provisional Agreement” whereby Security agreed to sell all 
its assets and undertaking to Premier. Subject to ratification, Premier 
was to issue to each shareholder o f Security one and one-half shares, 
or, at the option o f each shareholder, to pay $102 in cash and issue 
one-half share, for each share held. There being three parties involved. 
Security, Premier, and the shareholders o f Security, the transaction
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262 LaBrie, The Principles o f Canailian Income Taxation (1965), at p. 497.
263 Ibid., at p. 498.
264 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 105.
265 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 81 (4).
266 2 D.T.C. 513 (Exch. Ct.).
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had elements o f a sale o f  assets and a share exchange. W ithout 
actually deciding this question, the court held the transaction to be 
a “ winding-up, discontinuance or reorganization” within section 81. 
Substance, not form, was to govern. Adopting the opinion of 
Buckley, J.267 none of the words “ . . . has any definite legal meaning. 
Each is a commercial term and not a legal term, and, even as a 
commercial term has no exact definite meaning.” 268 Security had 
discontinued its business in a real and commercial sense. “ W hat 
was done with the business of the Security Com pany fell somewhere 
within the meaning and spirit o f those words . . .  It is immaterial in 
my opinion that the consideration received by the appellant for her 
shares happened to reach her directly from the Premier Company 
and not through the medium o f the Security Com pany.” 269 Thus, 
through faulty planning, the transaction had the legal effect o f a 
sale o f assets.
Where the transaction is a sale of shares, the vendor’s tax gains 
are the purchaser’s tax losses. The two m ajor disadvantages o f a 
purchase of shares are (1) usually lower capital cost allowances than 
afforded on a purchase o f assets and, (2) the “ locking-in” o f un­
distributed income.
Often the purchase price for the shares or assets o f a company 
is higher than the book value o f the company. Since property is 
recorded at cost, where a purchase of assets is undertaken, the book 
value of the property may be written up to its fair m arket value. 
Where there is depreciable property, the purchaser will obtain a 
greater capital cost allowance than that currently allowed the vendor. 
Where the transaction is a sale of shares, the company retaining its 
corporate identity, the depreciated capital costs o f the company 
are continued. The tax effects can be substantial.
The “ locking-in” o f undistributed surplus is a tax concept 
enacted to block tax avoidance schemes but having much broader 
ramifications.270 Prior to 1950, taxpayers owning companies with a 
large surplus would sell the shares to another company owned by 
the taxpayer for a small am ount of capital and considerable debt. 
Repayment o f the debt was a capital gain to the taxpayer. The earned 
surplus was paid to the new company in the form o f a dividend, 
which, being an intercorporate dividend, was tax free. Thereby the 
funds became available to pay off the indebtedness. The process is 
known as “dividend stripping” .
267 In re South African Supply and Cold Storage Company, [1904] 2 Ch. D. 
268.
268 Merritt v. M.N.R., 2 D.T.C. 513, at p. 515 (Exch. Ct.).
269 Ibid., at p. 516.
270 This part is based on Kelsey, Some Taxation Aspects o f Corporate Amalga­
mations (1960), 8 Can. Tax J. 236.
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The remedy enacted by Parliament was to prevent the payment 
o f the tax free dividends under these circumstances. The circum­
stances however include any transfer o f control o f the corporation,271 
control being defined as 50 per cent o f the issued share capital having 
full voting rights.272 W here control is transferred, the earned surplus 
o f the acquired company at the time o f purchase becomes “ desig­
nated” , and dividends paid therefrom are taxable in the hands o f 
the parent corporation.
This problem is only acute if the parent com pany wants the use 
o f funds o f the newly acquired subsidiary or plans to liquidate it.
On the other hand, the purchase o f shares is the only means o f 
effecting a merger or acquisition and m aintaining the right to deduct 
prior losses o f the acquired company. However, where a transfer o f 
control o f a company with a business loss occurs, the acquired 
corporation must continue to carry on the business in which the 
loss was sustained 273
Amalgamations—Section 851
Where (1) the am algam ated corporation acquires all the assets 
and liabilities o f the predecessor274 corporations and, (2) all the 
shareholders o f the predecessor corporations become shareholders 
in the amalgamated corporation, the transaction may be subject to 
a number o f special rules. Section 851 exemplifies the theory that 
a merger does not radically alter the economic position o f the share­
holders or the corporations and therefore the usual rules attendant 
normal sales transactions should not apply. Section 851, however, 
is limited to statutory am algam ations, mergers by a sale of assets 
being expressly excluded.275
Generally, section 851 stipulates specific individual rules for 
the accounting of each item affected by the am algam ation.
(a) Taxation Year o f the C orporation
Section 851 provides that upon am algam ation, the taxation year 
o f the constituent corporations is deemed to have ended and the 
taxation year o f the amalgamated company is deemed to have com ­
menced. This treatm ent is com parable to  a consolidation where two 
companies sell their assets to a third. In contrast, in a merger involv­
ing a sale o f assets, the taxation year o f the surviving corporation 
continues.
271 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 28(2).
272 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 28 (3).
273 R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, ss. 27 (I) (e), 27 (5a); Holiday Knitwear Limited v. 
M.N.R., 63 D.T.C. 116 (Tax A. Bd.).
274 Section 85 I refers to the heretofore named constituent corporations, as 
predecessor corporations.
275 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 85 I (1).
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The rule is not w ithout significance. In a few situations, the 
timing of the am algam ation may result in a considerable tax saving. 
Consider two corporations contem plating am algam ation with the 
following quarterly earnings:
Quarter Company A Company B
F ir s t ............................................... $ 6,000 $ 6,000
Second........................................... 11,000 11,000
Third............................................... 18,000 18,000
F o u r th ........................................... 15,000 15,000
Total ............................................  $50,000 $ 50,000
Amalgamation o f the companies a t the end o f the second quarter 
would cause tax liabilities as follows:
Company A 21 % of $17,000 =  $ 3,570
Company B 21 % of $17,000 =  3,570 
Amalgamated Co.21 % of $35,000 =  $ 7,350
50 % of $31,000 =  15,500 22,850
$ 29,990
On the other hand, waiting until the end o f the third quarter changes 
the tax liabilities to :
Company A 21% of $35 0 0 0 =  $ 7,350
Company B 21 % of $35,000 =  7,350
Amalgamated Co.21 % of $30,000 =  6,300
$ 21,000
The difference is the result o f using the initial lower tax rate 
to  its fullest possible extent before am algam ation. In future years, 
the loss o f the initial lower tax rate for each company is substantial. 
An am algam ation o f four unassociated companies each earning in 
excess o f $35,000 per year increases the tax burden by $21,450 per 
year.
(b) Inventory
Section 851 also permits the transfer o f inventory without 
recognition of any gain or loss. The provision states that inventory 
shall be deemed to have cost the new corporation the value attributed 
to inventory by the predecessor corporation in com puting its income 
for its last taxation year.
(c) Capital Cost Allowance
Pursuant to an am algam ation within section 85E, the capital 
cost and undepreciated capital cost o f the property to the pre­
decessor corporations are carried forward to the new corporation 
for tax purposes. No recapture or terminal losses are recognized.
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(d) Business Losses
The carryover loss provisions have a long history o f attem pts 
by taxpayers to  offset losses o f one business against the income of 
another.276 Section 851 prohibits a deduction by the new corporation 
o f business losses sustained by predecessor corporations.
(e) Undistributed Income
In keeping with the continuity theory, the undistributed incomes 
of the predecessor corporations are added together for purposes of 
taxation. The total is available for dividends. In the continuing game 
of dividend stripping, section 851 was an easy alternate route.277 The 
section avoids the concept o f designated surplus, and consequently, 
the protection it afforded the D epartm ent o f Revenue.
In a counterm ove to dividend stripping, Parliam ent enacted 
section 105C,278 which imposes a tax o f 20%  on the am ount by 
which the undistributed incomes o f the predecessor corporations 
exceeds the value o f the assets (excluding goodwill) less liabilities. 
More generally, a tax is payable on the am ount by which the un­
distributed incomes of the predecessor corporations exceed the 
equity o f the am algam ated corporation. In effect, shareholders may 
not convert their interests in the predecessor corporations into debt 
o f the am algam ated company for an am ount greater than their 
original equity w ithout paying a tax. Only common shares are con­
sidered capital for the purpose o f section 105C. Thus redeemable 
preferred shares may not be used to circumvent the section. How­
ever, there are o ther possible loopholes, o f concern only to those 
involved in dividend stripping, o f which we are not.279
While there is no authority, it would appear that any “ boot” 280 
accompanying a section 851 am algam ation would be deemed a 
dividend.281 Legally, an am algam ation is not a purchase and there­
fore such payment could not be considered as part o f any “ price” . 
In addition to the question o f ultra vires, it would be even more 
difficult to constitute it as a gift. Further, the use of “ boo t” may 
disqualify the merger from section 851 which requires tha t “ all the 
property o f the predecessor corporations immediately before the
276 e.g., Holiday Knitwear Limited v. M.N.R., 63 D.T.C. 116.
277 Kelsey, Some Taxation Aspects o f Corporate Amalgamations (1960), 8 Can. 
Tax J. 236.
278 (1959), 7 & 8 Eliz. II, c. 45, s. 26.
279 See Kelsey, Some Taxation Aspects o f Corporate Amalgamations (1960), 
8 Can. Tax J. 236.
280 The term “ boot” refers to a cash payment to the shareholders accompany­
ing the amalgamation.
281 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 8 ( l) (b )  or s. 81 (1). Quaere: does the recipient 
satisfy the definition of “shareholder” ?
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merger becomes property of the new corporation by virtue o f the 
merger.” 282 Here, much depends upon the judicial interpretation o f 
the words “ immediately before” .
The section refers to the am algam ated company as a “ new 
corporation” 283 for tax purposes, while the corporations and com ­
panies acts refer to it as a continuing corporation. The technical 
difference is o f considerable im portance, for the special rules set 
out in the section do not completely cover all the problems that arise 
on a statutory am algam ation. M ore generally, the question is 
whether the corporate continuity theory in corporate law applies to 
statutory am algam ations for tax purposes.
In John H. Scott v. M. N. /?.284 Assistant Chairm an Fordham  
held that although the corporate law reads to the contrary, for tax 
purposes the corporate entity formed as a result o f an am algam ation 
is deemed to be a new corporation. The decision denied the taxpayer 
a deduction for certain mining and exploration expenses advanced 
to one of the predecessor corporations when he later sold his shares 
in the am algam ated corporation. Presumably, a contrary holding 
would have permitted the deduction.
In contrast, Assistant Chairm an Fordham  in Palmer-McLellan 
{United) Ltd. v. M. N. /?.285 accepted prevailing opinion that an 
am algam ation is to be regarded as a continuation of the predecessor 
corporations and not a new corporation. This time the taxpayer was 
denied a deduction after am algam ation for interest on borrowed 
money because the funds previously had been used to earn non- 
taxable income, i.e., dividends. Amalgamation and the disappearance 
o f the shares changed nothing.286
John H. Scott v. M .N .R ., as well as La Tribune Inc. v. M .N .R,287 
are under appeal to the Exchequer Court.288 Hopefully, the conflict­
ing views will be resolved.
Financing— The Deductibility o f Interest
Interest payable on borrowed money used for the purpose of 
earning income from a business or property (other than borrowed 
money used to acquire property the income from which would be 
exempt) is a deductible expense for income tax purposes.289 The 
deductibility o f interest paid on funds used to finance a merger or
282 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 85 1 (1) (a).
283 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 85 1 (1).
284 66 D.T.C. 306 (Tax A. Bd.).
285 67 D.T.C. 323 (Tax A. Bd.), affirmed 68 D.T.C. 5304 (Exch. Ct.).
286 Accord, La Tribune Inc. v. M.N.R., 67 D.T.C. 507 (Tax A. Bd., St. Onge).
287 Ibid.
288 Dominion Tax Cases (Current), 9025.
289 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 11 (1) (c).
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acquisition is often met with two objections. First, there is the 
question o f using the funds to earn exempt income. Inter-corporate 
dividends are normally tax free.290 Therefore, interest paid on funds 
used in the acquisition o f shares is not deductible.291
Second, section 11 (l)(c) requires that the funds be used for 
the purpose o f earning income from a business or property. And 
even though the preamble to section 11 states that section to be 
notwithstanding paragraphs (a), (b) and (h) o f section 12 (1), those 
sections appear to have overshadowed section 11 (1) (c). Section 12 
(l)(b ) disallows capital expenditures. When interpreting section 11 
(l)(c), the courts tend to disallow a deduction for interest paid on 
funds used to provide capital for a  business:
It is important to remember that in the absence of an express statutory 
allowance, interest payable on capital indebtedness is not deductible as 
an income expense. If a company has not the money capital to com­
mence business, why should it be allowed to deduct the interest on 
borrowed money? The company setting up with its own contributed 
capital would on such a principle be entitled to interest on its capital 
before taxable income was reached, but the income statutes give no 
countenance to such a deduction. To extend the statutory deduction 
in the converse case would add to the anomaly and open the way for 
borrowed capital to become involved in a complication of remote 
effects that cannot be considered as having been contemplated by 
Parliament. What is aimed at by the section is an employment of the 
borrowed funds immediately within the company’s business and not 
one that effects its purpose in . . .  an indirect and remote m a n n e r .292
The distinction between funds used for the purpose o f earning 
income immediately within the com pany’s business and funds used 
for the acquisition of capital assets to earn income is w ithout merit. 
There is no justification for imputed interest deduction o f a com ­
pany setting up with its own capital any more than  we should impute 
interest income for idle capital. The only anom aly is the fact one 
company must pay interest and one need not.
In sum, interest paid on funds used to acquire shares in another 
company is not a deductible expense because o f the exempt income 
rule. Where the funds are used to acquire capital assets, a deduction 
is also disallowed, this time on the ground section 11 (l)(c) is some­
how restricted to funds used for the purchase o f non-capital assets.
Accounting Aspects
Some Business Considerations
In the valuation o f a company the present tendency is to place 
substantial weight on the earning power o f the business. But capital­
290 R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 28 (1).
291 Cf. Palmer-McLellan (United) Ltd. v. M.N.R., 67 D.T.C. 323, at p. 324 
(Tax A. Bd.).
292 Canada Safeway Ltd. v. M.N.R., 57 D.T.C. 1239, at p. 1244 (Sup. Ct. Can.).
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ization o f earnings is a deceptively simple procedure. For one thing, 
the proper rate o f capitalization is difficult to determine and it often 
differs substantially from firm to firm in the same industry. Inter­
industry comparison is impossible. Those divergencies have im port­
ant consequences in putting together either a small merger or a 
conglomerate.
If two companies are currently trading on the m arket at dif­
ferent rates o f capitalization, a merger will have the net effect o f 
increasing the earnings per share of one o f the companies and if 
the higher capitalization is continued to be used, there will be an 
increase in the market price. Com pare Company A earning $1 per 
share and trading at S10, e.g. capitalized at 10% and Company B 
earning $2 per share and trading at $10, e.g. capitalized at 5% . If 
each company has 100 shares outstanding and Com pany A acquires 
Company B by issuing another 100 shares to Company B o r its 
shareholders, Company A now earns $1.50 per share. If Com pany A 
continues to be capitalized at 10 per cent, the market price will 
increase to $15 per share. With the change in management control 
o f Company B, the application o f the old capitalization factor may 
not be as illogical as it might first appear. In conglomerate circles, 
there is a continuing search for sound companies trading at low 
price-earnings ratios.
In special situations, the plan must be modified to be attractive 
to Company B. Consider the case where Company B has been paying 
out large dividends and Company A has not, e.g., suppose Com ­
pany A has paid no dividends and Company B, $1 per share. The 
shareholders o f Company B may not want to lose their dividend. 
One solution is for Company A to issue convertible preferred shares 
carrying a $1 preferred dividend. N ot only is the dividend issue 
resolved but, in the example, the earnings per share on the common 
is increased to $2 per share. This, however, is somewhat illusory. 
When the preferred shares are converted into common, earnings 
per share drop back to $1.50.
Purchase and Pooling Concepts
The preceding plan is dependent on there being no substantial 
change in the accounts o f both companies. General accounting 
principles require that all items be recorded at cost. The cost o f the 
merger to Company A is the fair market value of the assets o f C om ­
pany B, received as consideration for the issuance o f shares. Assum­
ing the fair market value o f the assets o f Company B to be greater 
than the book value, the consequences of the purchase principle 
echo through the accounts o f the company.
Assets will be written up to their fair market value. Except 
in a section 851 am algam ation, the write up will offer greater capital
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cost allowance deductions. While there is a beneficial tax reduction, 
the procedure also reduces earnings. Further, the tax usefulness of 
the write-up depends on the extent o f depreciable property.
M ore critical is the treatm ent o f sums paid in excess o f the fair 
m arket value o f the assets, usually referred to as goodwill. The 
am ount paid for goodwill can be substantial. The usual practice is 
to  write it off over a period o f years against earnings. But while this 
reduces reported earnings, it is an  expense which is not deductible 
for income tax purposes.
Finally, the purchase concept forbids the pooling o f retained 
earnings. Any sums received for the newly issued shares must be 
credited to the capital accounts.
In sum, although there are possible tax advantages resulting 
from increased capital cost allowances, the purchase concept as it 
relates to mergers has several undesirable features in the m arket 
place. It is in direct conflict with attem pts to create an appearance 
o f  increased earnings.
To alleviate the problem, the accounting profession has dis­
tinguished two types o f business com binations—a purchase and a 
pooling o f interests. Broadly speaking, the definitions correspond to 
the distinction made earlier between a merger and an acquisition. 
Accounting Research Bulletin N um ber 48: Business Com bina­
tions,293 issued by the Committee on Accounting Prodecure o f the 
American Institute o f Accountants,294 differentiates the types as 
follows:
For accounting purposes, a purchase may be described as a business 
combination of two or more corporations in which an important 
part of the ownership interests in the acquired corporarion or corpora­
tions is eliminated or in which other factors requisite to a pooling 
of interests are not present.
In contrast, a pooling o f interests may be described for account­
ing purposes as a business combination of two or more corporations 
in which the holders of substantially all of the ownership interests 
in the constituent corporations become the owners of a single corpora­
tion which owns the assets and businesses of the constituent corpora­
tions . .  .295 (Emphasis in original)
“ When a com bination is deemed to be a pooling o f interests, 
a  new basis o f accountability does not arise."296 The accounts o f the 
constituent corporations are carried forward, including assets, 
liabilities, surpluses and deficits “ except to the extent otherwise
293 (February, 1957), 103 Journal of Accountancy 54.
294 The Committee is now named the Accounting Principles Board.
295 Accounting Research Bulletin Number 48: Business Combinations (Feb­
ruary 1957), 103 Journal of Accountancy 54.
296 Ibid., at p. 55.
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required by law or appropriate corporate action.” 297 Thus there is 
no write-up o f assets o r accounting for goodwill. In sum, the un- 
favourabe features o f a purchase are avoided.
The pooling principle can be rationalized on the theory that 
it is illogical to record the accounts o f one com pany in the merger 
at book value and the other a t its fair market value when nothing 
has been withdrawn or invested.298 On the other hand, the theory 
that one com pany may acquire the retained earnings o f another has 
been criticized, as it distorts the entire concept o f income.299
One m ajor difficulty is to  determine when it is and when it is 
not proper to use the pooling o f interests concept. The most im port­
ant test is a continuity o f interest o f all shareholders. In the classic 
situation, all the shareholders o f the constituent corporations receive 
com m on shares o f the new corporation evidencing proportionally 
the same interest. However, Accounting Research Bulletin Number 
48 is not that restrictive.
F o r one, there is the problem o f proportionality. In addition 
to com m on stock, some shareholders receive cash or o ther securities 
as “ boo t” in the merger. How much “ boot” they may receive and 
the merger still to qualify as a pooling is uncertain. In the United 
States it has been suggested tha t the limitations imposed on “ boot” 
by the Internal Revenue Code under section 368 type reorganizations 
be applied. To qualify, voting stock must constitute 80% o f the fair 
m arket value o f the consideration received. Interlocking accounting 
and taxation principles has logic. But since the question o f quantity 
o f “ boot” is irrelevant under the Income Tax Act, this policy has 
no application. The m atter still remains open.
W hile a continuity o f interest or, in terms o f the bulletin, 
“ ownership interests” , refers basically to common stock, “ in some 
cases the term may also include other classes o f stock having senior 
or preferential rights as well as classes whose rights may be restricted 
in certain respects” .300 In particular, it would appear to include 
convertible preferred.
In C anada, the restrictions often appear to be ignored.301 In 
such circumstances, it is useful to keep in mind the possible liabilities 
and sanctions that may result. The accountant m ust consider the
297 Ibid.
298 Lay, Accounting for Business Combinations (1967), 91 Cdn. Chartered 
Acc. 329, at p. 333.
299 Paton and Paton, Corporation Accounts and Statements (1955), at p. 41.
300 Accounting Research Bulletin Number 48: Business Combinations (Feb- 
rurary 1957), 103 Journal of Accountancy 54, fn. 1.
301 Lay, Accounting for Business Combinations (1967), 91 Cdn. Chartered 
Acc. 329, at p. 331.
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possibility o f disciplinary action being taken by his professional 
association. Equally im portant is possible civil liability.302 It is 
doubtful, although possible, that pressures similar to those exerted 
by the United States Securities Exchange Commission for regulation 
o f accounting practices may be attem pted by Canadian securities 
commissions.303
Legal Problems304
The m ajor obstacle to the pooling o f interests concept is under­
standing the extent to which established legal doctrines relating to 
the accounting o f consideration received on the issuance o f shares 
apply in merger situations. Traditionally in Canadian company law 
the consideration received on the issuance o f shares is part o f the 
capital o f the company and not retained earnings.305 The latter 
represents corporate profits that are available for dividends. Since 
no dividend may be declared that will impair the com pany’s cap­
ital,306 a fortiori, if the consideration received is capital and dividends 
may be paid out o f earnings but not capital, no part o f the earnings 
o f the acquired company should become earnings o f the acquiring 
company.
The same result follows whether par or no par value shares are 
used. The aggregate am ount o f the consideration received by the 
company for the issuance o f no par value shares must be attributed 
to paid up capital.307 Prior to 1965, section 12 (10) provided that 
where a company acquired a going concern with earned surplus by 
issuing no par value shares, the directors could set aside as distribut­
able surplus, i.e., available for dividends, “ such part o f the considera­
tion for the issue and allotment o f such shares without nominal or 
par value as does not exceed the un-appropriated balance o f realized
302 Boyd v. Ackley (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 77 (B.C., Sup. Ct.); Hedley Byrne 
& Co. Ltd. v. Heller Sc Partners Ltd., [1964) A.C. 465 (H.L.).
303 Lewis, The Accountants Are Changing the Rules, Fortune (June 15, 1968), 
at pp. 177, 179.
304 This section is based on the problems discussed in Gormley, The Pooling 
o f Interests Principle of Accounting—A Lawyer's View (1968), 23 Bus. 
Law. 407. “The treatment of business combinations and acquisitions in 
financial statements presents problems of both accounting and law. It 
provides material for reflection on the responsibilities and relationships 
of accountants and lawyers in advising their mutual clients on particular 
transactions. It can sometimes be difficult to identify the point at which 
such an accounting problem becomes a legal problem, and vice versa. 
A part of the subject matter is within the legitimate jurisdiction of both 
professions. The resolution of such mixed problems often calls for intimate 
collaboration between accountant and lawyer.” : Ibid., at p. 407.
305 Toronto v. Consumer's Gas Co., [1927] 4 D.L.R. 102 (P.C.).
306 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 83 (2).
307 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 12 (7).
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net profits o f the going concern immediately before such acquisition.” 
This, however, is now no longer possible.
In the case o f par value shares, the result is not as certain. 
Section 12 (12) o f the Canada C orporation Acts reads:
Shares having a nominal or par value shall not be issued as fully
paid except for
(a) a consideration payable in cash at least equal to the product of 
the number of shares allotted and issued multiplied by the 
nominal or par value thereof; or
(b) a consideration payable directly or indirectly in property or past 
services that the directors in good faith determine by express 
resolution to be in all the circumstances of the transaction the 
fair equivalent of the cash consideration mentioned in para­
graph (a).
The wording o f the section indicates that Parliament was more 
concerned with the problem o f stock watering than with the hidden 
or secret reserves. Thus, the question o f accountability o f any 
consideration received over and above the am ount attributable to 
the stock is left open. However, on the basis o f the capital and 
dividend rules, it would appear tha t the consideration must be 
attributed to a capital account. Usually it is shown as premium on 
common shares.308 There is no legal foundation for the view that 
it may be attributed to retained earnings.309
In sum, the earnings o f the constituent corporations may not 
legally be combined and carried forward on the balance sheet o f 
the merged enterprise.
A merger by statutory am algam ation may be an exception to 
the above view. The am algam ation agreement must contain details 
o f “ the manner of converting the authorized and issued capital o f 
each o f the companies into that o f the amalgamated com pany.” 310 
It is possible that this provision is broad enough to circumvent the 
difficulties referred to above.311
While technically corporate law forbids a pooling, it is impliedly 
recognized by the Income Tax Act, which contemplates the addition 
o f earned surpluses on a statutory am algam ation.312 Section 30 of 
the Regulations o f the O ntario Securities Act also contemplates 
pooling o f interests:
A statement of profit and loss contained in a prospectus shall be
consolidated with respect to a subsidiary and the company only
308 See Toronto v. Consumers' Gas Co., [1927] 4 D.L.R. 102 (P.C.).
309 Contra, Parker and Bonham, Professional Accounting (1965), at p. 212.
310 Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 53, s. 128A (3) (h).
311 Parker and Bonham, Professional Accounting (1965), at p. 214.
312 Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, s. 851 (2) (k).
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from the date upon which control of the subsidiary was acquired 
by the company unless the ‘pooling of interests’ accounting concept 
has been applied.
Other Considerations
There are a number o f o ther m atters associated with mergers 
and acquisitions that w arrant recognition but, in most cases, will 
offer little difficulty in corporate planning in C anada. M ost o f  these 
m atters have been adapted from United States regulatory legislation 
but the legislation, its adm inistration, and the judiciary have lacked 
the vitality of their model. Included in this area is securities regula­
tion and anti-trust legislation. In addition, there has been a slight 
tendency toward national economic independence from the rest o f 
the world, and in recent years, in particular, from the United States.
Securities Regulation
W ith one broad brush, corporate mergers and acquisitions are 
for the most part exempted from regulation under the O ntario 
Securities Act.
A trade in a security of a company that is exchanged by or for the 
account of such company with another company or the holders of the 
securities of such other company in connection with a consolidation, 
amalgamation, merger or reorganization of either company or in 
connection with a take-over bid as defined in Part IX.313
is exempted from registration.314 The provision was probably based 
on Rule 133 promulgated under the Securities Act o f 1933 o f the 
United States.
The theory is based on the proposition that in the described situations 
the alteration of the stockholder’s security occurs not because he 
consents individually to an exchange but because the corporation 
by authorized corporate action converts his security from one form 
to another. In other words, certain types of corporate action require 
only a vote of directors; other types require a  vote of stockholders; 
and, when a stockholder votes on a proposed merger or the like, he is 
simply acting as a member of one of the corporate organs to effectuate 
corporate action and not exercising his volition the way he would if 
each stockholder weie individually offered a new security in exchange 
for his old.31*
U nder a provision similar to the predecessor o f Section 19 (1) 9 
in British Columbia, a com pany needing additional funds increased 
its capital and distributed its shares to the public. The transaction 
was exempt from registration, being a “ reorganization” . Sidney 
Smith, J. A. form ulated the policy in terms o f criminal law. After
313 The Securities Act (1966), 14 & 15 Eliz. II, c. 142, s. 19 (1) 9 (Ont.). *
314 The Securities Act (1966), 14 & 15 Eliz. II, c. 142, s. 58 (Ont.).
315 Loss, Securities Regulation (2nd ed., vol. 1, 1961), at p. 521.
U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL 81
finding “ reorganization” is a word o f  vague im port, being a word 
o f a rt and having no technical legal meaning, and that it is a com ­
mercial rather than a legal term, it was not inapt here.
It was urged upon us that we should have regard to the mischief 
which the Act under review was intended to remedy. This is true 
enough, and it is a most important consideration; but there are 
opposing considerations and I do not think the argument sufficient to 
outweigh them . . .  One must bear in mind that this is a penal statute 
which must be strictly construed and the party charged brought 
strictly within its terms; and that, as in all criminal proceedings, the 
charge must be driven home beyond reasonable doubt.516
If he is right, every private com pany going public could be 
exempt from registration by merely changing the authorized capital 
prior to distribution. Such an interpretation would nullify the 
entire statute.
In sum, most mergers and acquisitions are exempt from securities 
regulation. The major exception is the take-over bid. Where the 
purchaser offers to purchase more than 20 per cent o f the outstanding 
equity shares o f a company, the offer is subject to special regulation. 
Exempted from this definition are offers made by private agreement 
with individual shareholders and not made to shareholders generally; 
offers made through a stock exchange; purchases o f shares of private 
companies and public companies with less than 15 shareholders; and 
offers exempted by court order.317
The legislation requires the offering period to remain open 21 
days, and grants the shareholder 7 days in which to withdraw his 
shares. If the bid is for less than all the equity shares and a greater 
number is tendered, they must be taken up on a pro rata basis.318 
Finally, a take-over bid circular which must disclose specific in­
form ation must accom pany the take-over bid.319 
Antitrust Legislation
Every person who is a party or privy to or knowingly assists in, or in 
the formation of, a merger or monopoly is guilty of an indictable 
offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years.^zo 
Merger means the acquisition by one or more persons, whether by 
purchase or lease of shares or assets or otherwise, of any control 
over or interest in the whole or part of the business of a competitor, 
supplier, customer or any other person, whereby competition
(i) in a trade or industry,
(ii) among the sources of supply of a trade or industry,
316 R. v. Santiago Mines Limited, [1946) 3 W.W.R. 129, at p. 137 (B.C., C.A.).
317 The Securities Act (1966), 14 & 15 Eliz. II, c. 142, ss. 80 (b) & (g) (Ont.).
318 The Securities Act (1966), 14 & 15 Eliz. II, c. 142, s. 81 (Ont.).
319 The Securities Act (1966), 14 & 15 Eliz. II, c. 142, s. 85 (Ont.).
320 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 314, s. 33.
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(iii) among the outlets for sales o f a trade or industry, or
(iv) otherwise than in subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iii),
is or is likely to be lessened to the detriment or against the interest 
o f the public, whether consumers, producers or others;321
D espite “ a strongly-w orded s ta tu te  perta in ing  to  m ergers” ,322 
there a re  relatively few obstacles to  the p lanning  o f  a business 
com bination .
To date the efforts that have been made to apply the merger provisions 
have been conspicuously ineffective. A total o f eight investigations 
o f the possibly detrimental effects o f  a merger has been made under 
the Act, five o f them since the second World War. O f that total, only 
four have resulted in prosecution in the courts. O f the other four, 
the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission found no action neces­
sary in two cases; it recommended in one that prosecution be con­
sidered, and it concluded in another that no effective action against the 
mergers in question was possible. In all four o f the court cases, the 
Crown was totally unsuccessful in proving to the court that an offensive 
merger had taken place. In the two most recent o f these, in fact—The 
Canadian Breweries and the Western Sugar cases— the judgment was 
such as to raise a question whether the existing legislation could ever 
be given practical effect, or whether an impasse had been reached in 
Canada’s merger policy.323
Because o f  a curious d icho tom y between com bines agreem ents 
an d  m ergers, the legislation relating  to  the la tte r has been severely 
restricted. C om bines agreem ents w ere illegal by virtue o f  a provision 
in the C rim inal C ode if they “ undu ly”  lessened com petition .324 
M ergers were illegal by v irtue o f  the C om bines Investigation A ct if 
they were “ to  the detrim en t o r  against the interest o f  the public .”  By 
judicial in te rp re ta tion  the tw o term s becam e synonym ous. “ An 
agreem ent . .  . becom es crim inal w hen the preventing o r lessening 
agreed upon  reaches the po in t a t w hich the partic ipan ts in the ag ree­
m ent becom e free to  carry  on  these activities v irtually  unaffected by 
the  influence o f  com petition , w hich influence P arliam ent is taken  
to  regard as an  indispensable p ro tec tion  o f  the public interest . . .” 325 
T he D irec to r o f  Investigation and  Research has no t accepted the 
above pronouncem ent.
The following questions give some indication of the range of 
factors considered in the Combines Branch in assessing a particular 
merger from the standpoint o f  the statutory test whether competition
321 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 314, s. 2 (e).
322 Phillips, Canadian Combines Policy—The Matter o f Mergers (1964), 42 
Can. Bar. Rev. 78, at p. 87.
323 Ibid., at pp. 82-3.
324 Criminal Code (1953-54), 2 & 3 Eliz. II, c. 51, ss. 409-412 (Can.).
325 Howard S*nith Paper Mills Ltd. v. The Queen, [1957] S.C.R. 403, at p. 426.
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is or is likely to be lessened ‘to the detriment or against the interest
o f the public’:
1. Is there a sensibly defined product for which there are no close 
substitutes?
2. Is there evidence that a substantial market (even though this 
may be regional) is likely to be affected by the merger and is 
capable of fairly unambiguous definition?
3. In the absence o f competition among domestic suppliers, is 
there evidence in the form of a substantial tariff or statistics 
showing that only a small proportion o f the market is supplied 
by imports, that foreign suppliers cannot be looked to, to 
protect the public?
4. Is there reasonable assurance that there is no significant govern­
ment regulation?
5. Is there evidence that existing concentration ratios are high or 
that there is a large size-differential between the acquiring 
company and its rivals?
6. 'Is there evidence that the barriers to entry in the industry are 
high or that they will be raised by the merger or that new firms 
have not in fact entered the industry for some significant 
period o f time?
7. Is there evidence that competition remaining in the market is 
likely to be ineffective?
8. Does the acquiring firm have a history o f growth by merger 
or a history o f coercive or predatory action or any other anti­
competitive behaviour?
9. Is there any evidence o f intent to reduce competition or to 
dominate the industry?
10. Is there any likelihood that there will be foreclosure o f an 
important market or source o f supply to firms unconnected with 
the acquiring company?
11. To what extent is there evidence of a real possibility o f  in­
creased efficiency via economics o f scale or the transfer o f 
assets from incapable into capable hands?
12. Is there direct evidence o f detriment such as excessive profits or 
price enhancement following the merger?’*6
International M ergers and Acquisitions
O rganization  o f  a m ulti-national co rp o ra tio n  presents num erous 
difficulties not found in the usual m erger o r acquisition . D iffering tax 
structures, co rpo ra te  con tro l legislation, and  general political a t ti­
tudes m ay be critical factors.
M ost factors have tended to  a ttra c t foreign investm ent in C a n ­
ada , especially from  the U nited  States. In 1963 foreign ow nership  o f  
C anad ian  m anufacturing  industries was 54 per cent an d  foreign 
con tro l, 60 per cent. Foreign ow nership  and  con tro l o f  m ining and  
sm elting was 62 and  59 per cent respectively; petro leum  and  natural 
gas, 64 and  74 per cent.327 Put an o th er w ay, 45 o f  C a n ad a ’s 100
326 Report o f the Director of Investigation and Research (1966), at p. 19.
327 Task Force on the Structure o f Canadian Industry, Foreign Ownership
and the Structure of Canadian Industry (1968), at pp. 9-10.
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largest m anufacturing , resource and  utility com panies are  foreign 
con tro lled .328
T he trend has been increasing and  o f  som e concern  to  C anad ian  
political and  econom ic independence.329 Several m easures have been 
taken  an d  o thers p roposed  th a t directly relate to  the acquisition  o f  a 
C anad ian  com pany by a foreign co rpo ra tion .
Via the C an ad ian  Incom e Tax A ct, an  a ttem p t has been m ade 
to  m ain ta in  a t least 25 per cent o f  the capital stock  o f  C anad ian  
co rp o ra tio n s in C anada . D ividends o f  C anad ian-based  co rp o ra tio n s 
paid to  non-resident shareholders are subject to  a surtax  o f  15 per  
cent. If  25 per cent o f  the  shares having full voting rights were ow ned 
by one o r  m ore individuals resident in C an ad a  o r  listed on  a C a n ­
ad ian  stock exchange, and  25 per cent o f  d irectors are  resident in 
C anada , then the surtax  to  non-residents is reduced to  10 per cent.ii0  
Because o f  the provision, som e acquisitions have been lim ited to  
75 per cent o f  the share capital acquired  by foreign co rpo ra tions. 
H ow ever, its effectiveness is questionab le .331
Corporations going abroad exhibit a marked preference for 
direct investment in a branch or subsidiary rather than licensing 
arrangements or joint ventures with local firms, and show a further, 
and very strong preference for a wholly-owned subdidiary rather than 
a subsidiary with local minority shareholders. Such corporations are 
reluctant either to share the return that results from their special 
advantages, or to dilute ownership in such a way that it becomes 
more difficult to maintain control over the subsidiary. In part the 
firms want to capture all the rents; in part they wish to avoid the 
inconveniences that result from letting outsiders have a voice in how  
the firm should be run.332
M ore effective legislation has been enacted  in som e industries. 
The T ru s t C om panies A ct333 restricts non-resident shareho lders from  
individually holding m ore th an  10 per cent o f  the cap ita l stock o f  a 
trust com pany  and  aggregate shares held by non-residents to  25 per  
cent. N on-residen t shareholders o f  banks are subject to  sim ilar 
restric tions.334
328 The Financial Post (July 20, 1968), at p. 11, col. 1.
329 See, generally, Task Force on the Structure o f Canadian Industry, Foreign 
Ownership and the Structure o f Canadian Industry (1968); Gordon. 
A Choice for Canada (1966).
330 Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 148, ss. 106 (la ), I39A (1).
331 Scase, The Degree o f Canadian Ownership: An Exercise in Futility ? (1965).
3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 295.
332 Task Force on the Structure o f Canadian Industry, Foreign Ownership 
and the Structure o f Canadian Industry (1968), at pp. 43-44.
333 (1964-65), 13 & 14 Eliz. II, c. 40, s. 36B (Can.).
334 (1966-67), 15 & 16 Eliz. II, c. 87, s. 53 (Can.).
